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Abstract
Over the next 20 years, it is projected that India will make the transition from a primarily
rural economy to one in which more than half of its 1.1 billion strong population will live in
urban areas. As this demographic shift occurs, the Indian Government is tasked with providing
the necessary urban and regional infrastructure to accommodate this growth. At present, existing
urban infrastructure systems are operating well above capacity so that any response must address
both the existing shortfall and impending demand. To meet its massive infrastructure
requirements, India must mobilize resources at an unprecedented scale and speed.
This thesis examines the use of land-based public finance as one avenue through which a
significant portion of this financing might be obtained. In particular, I focus on one type of land-
based public financing recently undertaken in India - a land-incentivized joint venture. I suggest
that this 'tool' is premised on a set of assumptions or enabling preconditions that are largely
necessary for its success. Thus I use this thesis first to outline what I have come to understand
the main set of these assumptions to be. I then briefly examine the case of the Bangalore
International Airport that was built in 2008 under a land-incentivized joint venture. As I am
constrained by my lack of in-depth information on many aspects of the case, I use the case
merely as a tool to illustrate how a number of the implicit assumptions might be compromised in
actual implementation. It is hoped that identifying possible sources of complication can begin to
help policy makers and future researchers think about accompanying reform that can facilitate
the future use of land-incentivized joint ventures in the broader Indian context.
In particular it appears that addressing some existing distortions and structural
inefficiencies, particularly in land markets, might lead to better land-based finance outcomes.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
India stands at the brink of an urban transformation. According to the McKinsey Global
Institute (MGI), over the next two decades, this change will occur at a scale and pace that has not
been witnessed anywhere in the world other than in China (2010, 14). According to estimates, in
the next 20 years Indian cities will house over 590 million residents - a result of a doubling in
the rate of urbanization of the last 40 years (Sankhe and Dobbs 2010). Cities are expected to
generate more than 70 percent of GDP by 2030, and drive large increases in per capita incomes
and consumption across the country (MGI Report 2010, 17). Based on current projections India
will have 68 cities with populations of more than 1 million, 13 cities with more than 4 million
people and 6 'megacities' with populations of 10 million or more (ibid, 15). Many of these cities
will be larger than the size of some countries today in terms of both population and economic
output. For example, it is projected that the Mumbai Metropolitan Region's estimated 2030 GDP
of $265 billion will be larger than the individual GDPs of Portugal, Colombia, and Malaysia
(ibid., 16).
One of the most critical issues that policy makers must address as they prepare for this
new reality is that of providing urban and regional infrastructure. This infrastructure - city roads,
highways, airports, ports, large scale water and sanitation systems, public housing, power lines,
transit systems and so on - is critical both to quality of life and to continued economic growth.
The massive in-migration to cities in recent years has put tremendous pressure on existing
infrastructure systems, most of which were not designed to deal with the capacity they are
currently forced to bear. As investment has been slow to catch up to demand, the majority of
urban residents currently live without some of the most basic of infrastructure facilities. As Rina
Chandran documents in an article for Reuters on August 3, 2010, about 60 percent of Mumbai's
18 million residents live in slums without formal access to piped water, sanitation or electricity.
Moreover, she writes, the lack of urban infrastructure, particularly airports, freight lines and
roads, is also one of the most often cited constraints to India's growth, taking an estimated 2
percentage points off GDP every year.
1.1 Context
A large part of the reason for this urban neglect is that Indian cities have long been what
IT entrepreneur turned Cabinet Minister Nandan Nilekani (2009) calls "fugitives in the Indian
imagination". He argues that from the time of Independence, Indian cities have been pitted
against rural India in the popular imagination as representing a rich versus poor divide - a bias
that is clearly reflected in legislation that has favored rural over urban investment programs in
almost every respect'. However, in 2005, in recognition of a number of factors including the
glaring gap between per capita expenditure on rural versus urban citizens (Rs 1000 versus Rs
100 respectively), the massive urban infrastructure deficit and the catalytic and central role that
cities had been playing in economic development, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal
Mission (JNNURM) was established (Ramanathan 2005). For the first time in India's history,
this national program has acknowledged the need for a strategic, systematic and holistic
approach to the city management and development process.
On the infrastructure front alone there are two challenges to be addressed. One, the time
compaction created by the increasingly rapid rate of urban growth necessitates an expeditious
response that not only makes up for the large backlog in infrastructure supply but also
simultaneously anticipates and provides for imminent demand. Two, the scale of the challenge
requires a mobilization of resources unprecedented in the nation's history. India currently spends
only $17 per capita on urban infrastructure, compared to China's $116 (Sankhe and Dobbs 2010).
To meet current growth projections and offer a decent standard of living to its citizens, it is
estimated that India will need to invest $134 per capita every year for the next 20 years (MGI
Report 2010, 19). This figure represents an eight-fold increase over current spending levels. The
MGI predicts that overall India needs to inject an additional USD 1200 billion of capital
spending into its cities between now and 2030 (ibid.). Yet, according to Nilekani, the work of the
High Powered Expert Committee on Urban Infrastructure convened in May 2008 seems to be
indicating that the amount of money that can be generated through traditional government
sources is grossly inadequate to meet the investment needs of Indian cities2 (Nilekani 2009).
Given this constraint, developing an effective response to this challenge requires a
fundamental rethink of the manner in which the country's infrastructure has been financed to
date. Already privatization and user fees have become more palatable to both governments and
1 That said, investment in rural infrastructure too is severely lacking as a large share of spending
goes towards subsidizing water, power and other agricultural inputs as well as towards a massive
nationwide food distribution program.
2 The findings of the Committee are in the process of being submitted to the Central Government
and are not yet publicly available.
end users as an appropriate method of financing (Garg 2007, 125-126). Increasing political
decentralization, that puts more responsibility for infrastructure investment in the hands of State
and Municipal governments and reduces the previous dependence on Central government
transfers means that new (or restructured) institutions and new funding mechanisms will need to
be deployed in the coming years. Some of these funding and institutional reform issues are being
tackled under the Urban Infrastructure and Governance sub-mission of JNNURM.
1.2 Scope of this Thesis
This thesis focuses an avenue of financing that could hold tremendous potential for India
- that of "Land-based Public Finance". In essence, land-based public finance refers to any
mechanism whereby publicly generated increases in the value of land are appropriated by the
government to fund public services or infrastructure. This mode of finance operates through a
range of 'tools' - amongst others, betterment levies, developer exactions, and outright sale of
government land - to deliver revenue. These tools are particularly effective in environments
where land values are rising quickly and where governments already own significant parcels of
land, although neither are necessary preconditions for their use. Fortuitously in many cities in
India, decades of state-led development have endowed governments at different levels with
extensive land banks, and the rapid economic growth of the last decade or so has spurred a
startling escalation in land prices (See Phatak 2009, 249 and Sridhar and Reddy 2009, 20)3. As
Chapter 2 will explain in more detail, the structure of most tools explored in this work, make
them well equipped to address both the speed and scale issues' of the Indian funding requirement.
Thus, at least in theory, land-based public finance could form a vital and significant portion of
the funding mix for urban infrastructure going forward. The MGI estimates that Indian cities
alone can generate over $27 billion a year from leveraging their existing land assets (2010, 74).
At present only $3 billion a year is generated from land monetization (ibid.).
Monetizing of land assets is fairly common in many of today's developed countries but
the systematic use of many of its tools is relatively new to many developing economies.
However, recently there has been strong interest in exploring land as a source of revenue in
Indian policy circles. The theme of the 2009 India Infrastructure Report was "Land - A Critical
3 It is important to note that this might not be true of all cities in India. Also, the government
entities that hold the largest land banks might vary from the city to city - from the army to
municipal or state government.
Resource for Infrastructure". In the same year, the Indian Urban Space Foundation, in
collaboration with the Brookings Institute and the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI)
organized a conference to bring together Indian and international policy makers, planners,
government officials and other experts to share their experience capturing land increments.
While some projects that leverage land assets have already been undertaken by the Indian
Railways and some city and state governments, this conference was formal recognition of the
fact that the extensive use of this avenue will be a major priority for the government going
forward.
As we will see in Chapter 2, land-based public finance has a number of compelling
advantages. With a current national debt to GDP ratio of 78 percent4 perhaps one of the most
enticing aspects of this financing option is its potential to reduce dependence on debt. However,
at the conference, numerous presenters highlighted some of the difficulties they have faced
implementing land-based tools in the Indian context. This is probably because, as is the case with
most economic models, land-based finance is predicated on certain base 'assumptions' regarding
the context in which it is deployed. When these assumptions fail, outcomes might be different
than anticipated and in some cases even generate negative externalities that wipe out most of the
gains. It is important therefore to try to identify what these assumptions - both implicit and
explicit - might be and then determine how the 'tools' might function in a context where these
preconditions are met either partially, or not at all. This scrutiny is important to help us
understand which tools might be most easily adapted or suited to the broader Indian context 5 . It
is critical to ensure that land-based finance doesn't generate its own set of liabilities. In other
words, we must ensure that the marginal benefits of its use equal the marginal costs and that
failed implementation doesn't bring a whole host of negative secondary effects and distortions
upon an already fragile fiscal system.
Institutional responsibilities and archaic land and property legislations are still evolving
as the administration comes to grips with the demographic changes underfoot. Economic
liberalization reform that began in 1991 is still in the process of dismantling an elaborate system
of controls that has left behind a legacy of distortions in land prices. Moreover, land is a
4 This is considered high as compared to an average of 45% for emerging economies (Topalova and
Nyberg 2010, 3)
5 In a country as diverse as India while it is hard to identify a uniform 'context' some of the issues
raised are broad enough that they could apply to a significant part of the country.
contentious and emotive issue in India where over half of the population is reliant on agriculture
as their main source of income. Shortsighted policies to exploit land assets could jeopardize
long-term financial stability and have intergenerational equity implications for the social and
economic development trajectory of the country. Thus while the literature presents us with a
whole menu of options to choose from it is essential that we first look at the fine print.
Towards the aim of better understanding the implications of land-based public finance of
infrastructure in India, this thesis examines the use of a 'land-incentivized joint venture' in the
construction of the Bangalore International Airport (BIA). In this case, the airport was built
under a public-private partnership (PPP) with land being the most important financing tool.
While generalizing on the basis of one case and one context is spurious it is nevertheless hoped
that this exercise will generate some insights and considerations for future use of at least this tool
of land-based finance.
1.3 Methodology and Limitations
The research for this work comes from secondary sources - technical documents,
agreements, newspaper articles, reports and opinion pieces. I have been careful to crosscheck all
my facts by only using those at appear identically in at least two independent sources. Overall,
for a lack of detailed information on many aspects of this case, I use this case more as a tool to
illustrate and highlight many of the potential issues that could arise from the use of this mode of
land-based finance and offer each issue as an avenue for future, more extensive research. For
example, while I am not able to quantify the benefits and costs encountered in the Bangalore
case, such an endeavor might be undertaken as more information on the case becomes available.
For data and information reasons I was constrained in my choice of cases to study. The
Bangalore Airport case is both interesting and representative of many of the infrastructure
projects being implemented in India. However, by virtue of being a PPP, some of the problems
and benefits encountered are inherent in all PPPs whether or not they use land as the primary
financing incentive. I have tried to make the distinction between those issues that arise from the
use of land and those that result from the exigencies of PPP formats.
Lastly, in describing the theory of land-based finance, I recognize that no tool can ever be
implemented perfectly in reality. Rather, it is a question of degree that determines failure or
success. Unfortunately because of the limited scope of this study, I did not provide any
comparative analysis between land-incentivized joint ventures and other land-based public
financing schemes.
1.4 Structure and Organization
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the theory of land-
based public finance and describes a subset of its tools most relevant to the Indian context. After
evaluating the pros and cons of each tool it summarizes the assumptions that underlie their
successful use. Chapter 3 briefly outlines the current fiscal structure and position of the Indian
government to highlight the need for alternative sources of revenue. Drawing on the information
presented in Chapter 2 it highlights how India might benefit from the prudent use of land-based
finance in theory. Chapter 4 examines the case of the Bangalore International Airport (BIA).
Using the framework of assumptions developed in Chapter 2, this chapter describes the potential
issues that might arise when a land-incentivized joint venture is executed in a reality where some
of the theoretical underpinnings do not hold. Chapter 5 concludes.
CHAPTER 2: LAND-BASED PUBLIC FINANCE
This chapter provides an introduction to the concept of land-based public finance,
and describes a subset of its "tools" that are most pertinent to the Indian context. These
tools have been identified by reviewing public discussions amongst policy makers, urban
planners and financiers as to how India might more systematically capitalize on escalating
land values to fund its massive infrastructure requirements and augment state and local
budgets. Thus, while there are a host of other tools used around the world such as Business
Improvement Districts, Tax Increment Financing and others, these are not discussed here.
At present, Indian policy makers are focusing primarily on the use of betterment levies,
developer exactions, land-incentivized joint ventures and land asset management.
While recognizing that each tool is modified to suit the context it is applied in, this
chapter broadly lays out the theoretical basis, pros and cons of each approach. It goes
further in trying to establish a dialectical relationship amongst the set of tools presented so
that the reader can appreciate how one mechanism, in theory, seeks to address the
shortcomings of another. Finally, this chapter summarizes certain fundamental
assumptions that implicitly or explicitly underlie most of the land-based financing
instruments. When these assumptions or pre-conditions fail, I argue, the tool may produce
sub-optimal outcomes or generate negative externalities that nullify the gains. The set of
assumptions developed in this chapter will provide a useful framework for evaluating the
performance of the land-incentivized joint venture undertaken for the BIA.
2.1 An Introduction to Land-Based Public Finance
Land-Based Public Finance refers broadly to any mechanism whereby increases in
the value of land are systematically appropriated by an authorized government entity to
fund public works, services, administrative operations or infrastructure. This mode of
financing is predicated on two, usually concurrent events - one, in light of increased
urbanization, population growth and income levels, a city's investment needs grow rapidly;
two, this growth in turn raises the value of urban land exponentially making it an attractive
potential source of revenue.
The desirability of a piece of land may increase due to any number of factors - rapid
urbanization, the building of public infrastructure, public perception of future worth,
changes in land use, population growth or private or community investment - and it is
assumed that the value of these enhancements are capitalized into immediate or
surrounding land values 6. Creating, estimating and capturing this increment is the goal of a
host of land-based financing tools that have been developed over the years. Property taxes
for instance, might be regarded as one of the oldest forms of land-based public finance; for
centuries rulers and governments have taxed away a portion of the value of land held by
private entities to fund activities of the state or kingdom. Over the years as the notion of the
state and private property has changed, attempts to balance efficiency and equity have
resulted in guidelines that govern what constitutes appropriate capture of land value. Most
crucially it must be ensured that value capture is not confiscatory i.e. that it does not take
away that portion of the increase in land value that accrues from private investment as that
return does not theoretically belong to the state (Hong 2010).
Referring to "tools" of land-based public finance can be misleading in that it implies
a level of homogeneity in structure and application of each tool that does not and should
not exist across the varying institutional structures, socio-economic, political and cultural
contexts that these tools are used. Property taxation schemes, though similar in their basic
concept, are designed very differently in different countries to best suit their unique needs
and constraints. Some tools are better suited to certain environments. In India for instance,
property taxation is underutilized and does not form a significant source of local
government income (Rao 2004, 22). This is because the high ratio of informal to formal
housing, political unfavorability of rural property taxation, rent control legislation, poor
land ownership and transaction records and weak reprehension of tax evasion make this
tax, or "tool" particularly difficult to administer and collect. In other countries however,
property taxes might form the backbone of a local government's budget. What this means
from a public finance perspective is that countries should consider those tools that yield
6 We can imagine this in the form of an equation where under perfect market conditions: Final Land
Price = Original Land Price + Market Valuation of Cost of Enhancement. While this is a gross
simplification and in reality there are numerous market imperfections that render this equation
inaccurate, it serves to explain the fundamental premise of land-based financing. Please see caveats
above.
them the most substantial income and are the most efficient and equitable for their
particular context. As conditions change (e.g. the gradual formalization of land markets) a
different set of tools might be employed. These may be applied either individually or
together and, as we will see below, should be chosen to best suit the nature of the
increment. Thus, the tools presented below should not be interpreted as cookie cutter, one-
size-fits-all solutions or as a depiction of a chronological progression of instruments that
have improved over time. Rather, they are presented as a range of mechanisms that have
responded to, but not completely overcome, the weaknesses of each other.
2.2 Some Tools of Land-Based Public Finance
2.2.1 Betterment Levies: Reclaiming Public Value
Betterment Levies, as a kind of property tax, are amongst the older tools of land-
based finance and have been used by almost every country under different names and
modified frameworks. In essence, they comprise a one-time charge against an unearned
increment in land values that is attributable to a publicly funded infrastructure project or a
change in municipal decisions on land use (Burki et al 1996, 364). The money earned from
the levy is then used to fully or partially cover the borrowing or spending incurred to build
the infrastructure in the first place. For example, it was argued that the Jubilee Line
Extension of the London Underground could have been entirely financed by betterment
levies within a 20-year period. To do so would involve taxing away part of the large
increment in land values observed by households along the project's length (that
presumably occurred due to the improved locational benefits) and using the earnings to
defray the project cost (Riley 2001 in Gihing 2009,11). As this example might indicate
however, betterment levies are conceptually simple but difficult to implement.
The first major difficulty from an implementation standpoint is that of accurate
estimation. Even in countries where land records are reliable and where land prices and
ownership have been tracked over a period of time, it is hard to isolate exactly how much
of an increase in observed land value can be directly attributable to one particular
investment or land use decision as opposed to other changing variables. Depending on how
land parcels are placed within a particular locality, a related problem is estimating how the
increment might differ between parcels. Moreover, as Peterson (2009) notes, while
empirical studies have consistently demonstrated a statistically significant relationship
between infrastructure investment and increases in land values, the actual magnitude of
this relationship has varied dramatically (38). To levy a heavy tax - with rates that have
typically ranged anywhere from 30 to 60 percent of the notional gain in value - with poor
empirical backing for its rationale, and large potential variability in its estimates, can prove
hugely unpopular(ibid.). In a 1962 study of agricultural taxation in Kerala, India it was
decided to abandon the imposition of a betterment levy following an important irrigation
project as the "discontentment that it would create [was] likely to be great" (Groves and
Madhavan 1962, 62). In many developing countries where concrete information on land
prices and title deeds is only now beginning to be collected systematically, this tool is
particularly hard to defend. Its political unpopularity has resulted in betterment levies in
their traditional form falling out of favor.
Great Britain made extensive use of a "development value tax" in the post Second
World War period but abolished this tax by 1954 due to high administrative costs,
estimation difficulties, and citizen discontent. (Davies 1998, 5). "Contribuci6n de
valorizaci6n" or "contribuci6n por mejoras" (literally, contribution for improvement) has
long been a part of infrastructure finance in Spain from where it was later transferred to
Latin America (Peterson 2009, 36). In the United States the variant on betterment levies
are "special assessment districts" or "benefit assessment districts". In India there are a
number of Acts that legislate the use of betterment levies or "Land Value Increase Tax".
Among them, the Mumbai Highways Act of 1955 offers the owner of the land the option to
pay the tax (equal to half the value of the increment) in terms of a parcel of land of
equivalent value (Phatak 2009, 231).
A reasonably successful variation on traditional betterment levies has been
formulated by the city of Bogota from 1997 onwards. Unlike the previous forms of
valorizaci6n this tax does not claim to be tied to actual increases in land values or one
specific infrastructure project but stands merely as an assertion of the belief that "the
public has a right "to participate" in increases in [socially generated] land values" (Doebele
1998, 6). The traditional system estimated land value gains before project construction
using a fixed (and often outdated) set of parameters to arrive at a 'notional' land value
increase and did not adjust the tax levied for actual observed changes in land value. This
meant that if for some reason land values did not rise as expected, or decreased due to
some other factor, residents still had to pay the same pre-determined amount. In the newer
variation however, instead of imposing a project-specific tax the city bundles together all
its infrastructure investments into one package and imposes a more general citywide
infrastructure tax whose magnitude varies according to broad 'benefit zones'. In
administering the tax, the city accounts for a number of factors, such as the ability of
different income groups to pay, the type of land-use being taxed (commercial-industrial
versus residential) as well as the traditional metrics of plot size and location (Peterson
2009, 63). The general nature and complex structure of this tax has made it harder to
disaggregate and challenge in court. Moreover, according to Peterson, the fact that the
revenue earned from the tax is now used to finance improvements across the city has
reduced resistance (ibid.). Indeed, one of the chief criticisms of traditional betterment
levies is that they are potentially 'vertically' inequitable i.e. since they have to be tied to a
specific location they tend to encourage development in those parts of the city where
authorities know they will be able to recover their costs. As a result there is more emphasis
on some neighborhoods relative to others, which leads to unequal infrastructure provision
within a city. Yet, also in theory, these levies have 'horizontal' equity because when they are
applied within a neighborhood all the residents are required to pay for the cost of
infrastructure investment on the basis of their property price (Hong 2010). Both
betterment levies and the developer exactions we will examine in the next section are
considered 'efficient' from a public goods perspective because beneficiaries pay exactly for
the cost of the goods they consume (ibid.).
Betterment Levies are costly to estimate and potentially inaccurate. Moreover, co-
ordination with a large number of stakeholders (individual households) makes them
administratively complex and expensive to administer. Being potentially subject to
litigation this tool can have a slow process of cost recovery. Since land markets are cyclical
and are affected by more than one factor i.e. beyond infrastructure provision, uncertainty
over future land prices makes revenue streams from this tool harder to predict. Thus, one
way to provide local infrastructure that cuts down the number of stakeholders and
increases predictability is to get developers to build, or pay for, the infrastructure required
to support new development or growth.
2.2.2 Developer Exactions and Impact Fees: "Paying Your Way"
There are a number of ways in which developers can be required to provide either
in-kind or monetary compensation for the additional infrastructure requirements their
property development imposes. Also known as "impact fees" the fundamental premise of
this form of land-based finance is that new development or growth imposes an externality
by way of increasing the pressure on infrastructure or requiring an extension of existing
infrastructure systems. Growth creates additional demand for sewage, water, roads,
electricity and other basic amenities. While it is typically the domain of local governments
to provide these services, it is argued that the cost of doing so should be at least partly
internalized by and recovered from the property development that necessitates it (Phatak
2009, 231 and Kirwan 1989, 291). Technically, developer exactions refer to developer
provision or compensation for internal project infrastructure whereas impact fees apply to
external infrastructure such as roads linking new projects to the existing road network.
This tool is "land-based" in that funds are typically raised through the sale or lease of the
developed land, or surrounding land whose value has been enhanced by the adjacent
development (Peterson 2009, 214).
While developer exactions are standard practice in most developing countries,
impact fees are largely only used in the United States (Peterson 2009, 45)7. However,
impact fees are being seriously considered in India as well with an MGI report
recommending that cities charge fixed impact fees for all new developments in order to
provide incremental trunk infrastructure. As per the recommendations, this charge would
be on a per-square-foot basis and set as a percentage of the property price e.g. 2-3 percent
for Tier I cities (MGI Report 2010, 75). As impact fees have become more common practice
in the United States, a set of guidelines has evolved. These guidelines primarily seek to
ensure that the impact fee charged is proportional to the incremental infrastructure
requirement that the growth necessitates and does not finance upgrades for existing users.
Revenue from impact fees may also not be used for the general operating expenses of local
7 Phatak (2009) argues that the critical 'rational nexus' between the cost of providing infrastructure
and the fees charged is easiest to establish in the United States on account of their well-established
practice of preparing capital improvement plans. This might explain why impact fees are more
widely used in the US than elsewhere (230).
government bodies (Peterson 2009, 46). Standardization of practice has gone a long way
towards reducing initial resistance from developers and any country that implements such
exactions will have to tread carefully in the initial stages so as not to dissuade new
development.
A related funding mechanism is the sale of development rights. For the Indian
context, these fall into two main categories - the right to convert landfrom rural to urban
use and the sale of additional construction rights such as those authorizing increased
density in Floor Area Ratio (FAR) 8 . Here too, the price charged for this change in regulation
should technically reflect the additional cost of servicing increased occupants. The MGI
Report cited above also recommends that Indian cities look to increase FAR around central
business districts or along major transport corridors and use the proceeds to finance the
higher infrastructure needs of those areas. In Mumbai, India's commercial capital, it is
estimated that an FAR increase from 1.3 to 4 in a key commercial area could fetch the
government Rs 4,000 - 5,000 (USD 879 - 109) per square foot (MGI Report 2010, 75). As
will be described later there are others who are strongly opposed to the idea of using FAR
sales.
The set of mechanisms presented above offer a number of benefits. For one, they
reduce the burden of debt on local or state governments by requiring the developer to raise
the funds required for investment. The timing of the inflow also offers an advantage over
betterment levies as governments can wait to extend infrastructure until they receive the
payment instead of being reimbursed later. However this is not always the case - in a slow
real estate markets governments may not have the bargaining power to obtain the required
level of developer exactions and may have to pay for the infrastructure themselves (Hong
2010). Yet, in requiring a strong link between additional demand imposed and
infrastructure provided, developer exactions might also offer more quid pro quo to
contributors than betterment levies. This greater perceived "fairness" could create greater
buy-in that could potentially speed up the process of service delivery and increase
8 This is known as Floor Space Index or FSI in India.
9 All conversions use the average Rupee/USD exchange rate from Nov 2009 to April 2010 (6 month
average) = 45.8086 as obtained from http://www.exchange-rates.org/history/INR/USD/T
accessed 05.03.10
predictability in government budgeting. Coordinating with individual developers instead of
multiple households might also make this process logistically simpler.
It is implied that developer exactions are also economically efficient in that they
ensure that the correct level of incremental infrastructure is provided (See Phatak's quote
below). Developers should be careful to ensure that the marginal revenue they expect to
earn (in the form of land value increments) from infrastructure provision equals the
marginal cost of providing it. Technically, government authorities should also be careful to
ensure than they do not grant more marginal revenue to developers than the marginal cost
they are able to extract after factoring in a reasonable profit margin. Thus it could be
argued that this tool ensures greater rationality in spending and less dead weight loss. Of
course, as we will see later, the reality of lumpy capital investments and the difficulties of
accurate estimation somewhat temper this advantage in reality.
Developer Exactions can also play an important role in the spatial development of
cities and introduce efficiency in the use of urban land. By varying the magnitude of impact
fees local governments can steer growth and development to where it can be best
accommodated or is most desired' 0 (Peterson 2009, 5). If demand and supply are allowed
to price the infrastructure cost of different locations, this method of financing could ensure
allocative efficiency as resources ostensibly flow to their most productive use. However
this logic assumes that governments have a master plan in mind (if not on paper), and the
foresight to predict future growth patterns. It does not account for situations where the
institutional structure is such that it allows for a principal-agent problem to develop; when
the same government body in charge of regulations stands to earn revenue from the
regulation change there is the moral hazard that the authority will exploit its power to
maximize its economic gain (Hong 2010). It could be imagined that in contexts where
political control over state or local government tends to swing from one political party to
another and incentive structures are more shortsighted this problem might be heightened.
10 At the same time, governments can charge extortionary impact fees to prevent or dissuade
development in a particular area. For example, a municipal government can come under pressure
to charge higher impact fees than are economically rational to block a condominium from being
built in an area of predominantly single-family homes (Hong 2010).
It could be equally troublesome in the case of single-party but kleptocratic government
institutions.
Thus, it appears that while developer exactions and its related tools overcome
some of the problems faced by betterment levies they also have their own set of problems.
For developers and governments to reach an agreement there still needs to be considerable
accuracy in predicting the magnitude and cost of the incremental infrastructure. Therefore,
much like betterment levies, this form of finance is less suited to countries where
estimation is cumbersome due to poor data. Estimation in turn relies on having a master
plan for the city, yet while most cities in India do have master plans these are rarely
followed in practice and cities tend to develop in a less planned manner. Further, this tool
assumes that existing infrastructure is already at its optimal level. Vidyadhar Phatak, the
former Principal Chief Planner for the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development
Authority (MMRDA) summarizes the difficulties with implementing developer exactions in
contexts such as these:
"The principle 'growth pays for itself followed in the USA implies that impact fees do
not cover the cost of clearing the backlog of infrastructure investment. It is possible
to follow this stipulation on account of the well-established practice of preparing
capital improvement plans. Indian cities, however, do not generally follow such a
practice 1 Consequently, it is difficult to estimate and attribute cost to additional
infrastructure required to new developments proposed. [Often] The infrastructure
investment requirements are so high that the required impact fees based on 'growth
pay for itself principle would be too high to implement." (Phatak 2009, 230)
Phatak is also critical of the sale of development rights particularly the sale of FSI in
cities like Mumbai where regulation has kept the intensity of development low. While FSI
can be sold for large sums of money in Tier 1 cities, he asks whether it is fair that
authorities exploit a scarcity rent that was caused by restrictions they have themselves
imposed 12 (Phatak 2009, 232). Sebastian Morris and Ajay Pandey (2010) take this
11 With the exception of mission cities participating in the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban
Renewal Mission (JNNURM) that are required to prepare City Development Plans including Capital
Investment Plan, 2006-13)
12 Moreover, since development rights (FAR etc) were never nationalized in India and therefore the
government does not technically 'own' these rights in the first place, this avenue actually requires
legal clearance before it can be a significant source of revenue. Despite this, many cities have
already begun the sale of FSI. (Phatak 2009, 232)
argument one step further. They argue that the historical practice of urban planning in
India has strayed so far from economic rationality so as to create massive distortions in
prices for urban land; charging for FSI or collecting other scarcity or regulation imposed
rents (such as for a change in urban land use) is hard to defend and restricts access to all
but the rich and upper middle classes (7).
Developer exactions suffer from the same equity problem as betterment levies in
addressing the needs of only a narrow section of the population. However, unlike
betterment levies whose variations have tried to correct for uneven infrastructure
provision, developer exactions by nature of their design require private investors and not
the government to make the first move. Thus beyond reasonable incentivization using
lower impact fees this tool might not be suited to address the needs of those parts of a city
or state where developers do not wish to locate. Since the magnitude of revenue is directly
tied to that of investment the funds raised do not benefit those outside the target
population. The following financing mechanisms seek to overcome this drawback by
serving as ways to raise funds that are not tied to a particular project and can be used with
greater latitude to develop new parts of the city. They also overcome a chicken and egg
situation in which cash-strapped governments cannot reap benefits from infrastructure
until they have raised the capital to invest in it in the first place.
2.2.3 Land Asset Management and Sale: Balance Sheet Optimization
Land Asset Management capitalizes on the fact that municipal and state government
authorities in many developing countries already own significant land parcels in their
jurisdictions. Monetizing these assets and using the money to invest in infrastructure can
be regarded as a desirable asset transformation especially in cases where the land is lying
idle. Land asset management offers a number of advantages over the tools listed above, as
long as the decision-making involved is strategic and not driven purely by financial gain.
Like all the other tools it also suffers from a number of difficulties in practice.
One of the most appealing features of this form of land finance is its potential to
generate large sums of money up-front. Unlike most other land financing instruments this
tool is unique in that revenue and investment are not necessarily linked to the same project
and the revenue earned can be put towards any use that the local government deems fit.
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However, it is expected that the bulk of the revenue would go towards capital and not
current expenditure. In 2009, the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA)
auctioned 69 acres of land for over $15 million to partially fund an Outer Ring Road for the
city - a transaction that generated revenue four times the annual property tax collection of
the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (Ramanathan 2010). This relatively quick schedule
of revenue generation affords significant benefits especially in countries where obtaining
long-term credit is difficult13 (Peterson 2009, 5). Both the volume and quick delivery of
revenue allows city or state governments to reduce their dependence on debt financing and
its associated fiscal risks (Ibid). As Ramesh Ramanathan, a prominent Indian civil society
activist and Chairperson of the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) of JNNURM points out,
when correctly utilized, land-financing of this sort allows cities to "accelerate infrastructure
build-out so that [they] are not constantly playing catch-up" as revenue trails economic
growth (Ramanathan 2010). Yet, while the potentially staggering revenue generating
capacity of this mode of financing makes it desirable, it is not in itself a rationale for its use.
Land asset management can also act as an important mechanism to direct growth in a
city by selectively freeing up new sites for development. Moreover, it is argued that use of
this tool allows governments to streamline their assets and utilize market indicators
(mainly price) to determine which land parcels are most useful to hold on to and which to
divest (Peterson 2008, 3). This benefit can fit into the broader argument for economic
efficiency mentioned above because in utilizing market indicators the tool introduces
market principles and rationality to government's asset management and decision-
making14. It is also argued that by outsourcing development activities to the private sector,
which can handle them more efficiently, land sales leave governments to focus on their
core 'business' (Peterson 2009, 216). In India many city and state governments such as the
MMRDA act as developers and lease their properties. However, often management of these
leases is poor, rents are nominal and construction is shoddy (Sridhar and Reddy 2009, 54).
Poor accountability and the lack of land records even for municipal government's own
13 This same potential for revenue generation can be quite troublesome as described below.
14 As a positive externality one could argue that by bringing the government into land markets they
act as a market maker which is especially helpful in countries where land transactions are often
informal and not transparent.
properties leads to significant abuse; in Karnataka it was found that the Judicial Employees'
Cooperative Housing Society illegally allotted and sold nearly 190 acres of land and sites to
excise, police and municipal government officials (ibid.).
Land Asset Management suffers from a number of drawbacks and caveats to its use.
For one, the argument for economic efficiency and market orientation is rendered moot if
the government is the main player in the real estate market. In that case there are few
"market signals" to rely on in making decisions regarding land sales (Hong 2010). Second,
depending on the institutional structure governing land regulation this form of finance is
also susceptible to a principal-agent or "referee" problem; similar to the issue with FSI, if
the same government authority that is selling its assets is also in charge of regulations that
could affect the price of the land then they might be able to earn supernormal profits by
artificially inflating land values to their benefit (Hong 2010 and Peterson 2009, 216).
Indeed, extensive reliance on this form of finance creates a vested interest for governments
to ensure that land prices are constantly increasing; inflated land prices (especially those
created by artificial means) in turn create distortions in the market for urban land.
Conflicts of interest and skewed incentives in government decision-making that lead
municipal and state governments to lose sight of the public good and turn into profit-
maximizing real estate agents also has serious implications for the spatial and economic
development of cities (ibid.).
Naturally, one of the most common risks of any scheme that involves such large sums
of money is the huge potential for corruption and misallocation of resources. However,
while this mode of finance can be particularly prone to corruption, this is true for all
methods of land finance to some extent and in itself it is not an entirely disqualifying
factor 5 . Instead the potential for rent-seeking should be an important factor in the design
of finance tools in situations where it is a particular concern. In developing countries where
land sales often lack transparency and accountability and where the institutional structure
1S In the mid-90s China made extensive use of land financing tools. Alongside its success there were
strong criticisms of funds being generated outside the budgetary requirements (EBFs or Extra
Budgetary Funds), of large-scale corruption and of misallocation of resources into shopping malls
and commercial complexes (Ramanathan 2010). As tax analysts Richard Bird and Christine Wong
remark, "while EBFs [in the range of 18-27% of GDP] are not at all bad [and provide] arguably
desirable autonomy to local governments [they also] add considerably to the obscurity of the
general public finance scene in China" (Bird and Wong in Ramanathan 2010).
might not yet be geared to manage new modes of financing, large and unaccounted
leakages are a common problem (Peterson 2008, 3). As Peterson (2009) documents,
Mumbai's principal development authority, the MMRDA, generated US$1.2 billion in
revenue from just two land auctions to developers in a prime commercial-business district
in January 2006 and November 2007 - a sum almost ten times the total MMRDA
infrastructure investment in 2004-2005 (91). Worryingly however, he notes that there has
been little documentation of where this money has been spent (ibid.).
With potentially large sums of money to be made, land asset management can
engender a dangerous culture of profligacy in cash-rich government bodies. Since land-
based finance hinges on prices in cyclical real estate markets city governments that become
overly reliant on revenue from their land assets might be badly affected by a downturn in
land values. Similarly, while rapid urbanization is likely to fuel large annual increases in
land prices this trend cannot be sustained over time. If revenue earned is not channeled
towards productive investment or being channeled into a ring-fenced infrastructure fund
and is instead used to finance a general expenditure budget, then apart from being a
wasteful use of funds, the administrative infrastructure itself might be unable to function in
more lean times. This is a particular problem with land asset management since there if no
legal obligation as such to spend the money earned on infrastructure or other investment.
Yet more generally it is critical that while governments should use land as an important
element in their financing mix, they realize that this resource too is finite. China serves as
an example - after 15-20 years of relying on land-leasing revenue they have now had to
switch to user fees, other project revenue streams and domestic savings as the potential for
raising funds from land are exhausted. A major contributing factor to this change was a
sharp reversal in land value appreciation after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997
(Ramanathan 2010).
A final downside of land asset management could be that selling off government
land depletes the finite asset base of the government agency in the long-term as they
forsake rights over future revenue streams that the land might produce. Land also has
value as a strategic asset and it is possible that governments might not want to reduce their
monopoly in this area completely. Thus one final tool considered below is the "land-
incentivized joint venture" which allows governments to utilize their land assets as
collateral without permanently losing control over them. This tool has received great
interest in India for the tremendous potential it offers for entering public-private
partnerships without much monetary investment.
2.2.4 Land-Incentivized Joint Venture
Independent of land-based finance, many developing countries have begun to look
at PPPs as a way of overcoming their budget constraints. Land can be an important part of
PPPs as it allows government bodies to enter these agreements by leveraging the value of
the assets they already posses (such as land) and limiting their monetary contribution to a
project. Typically, PPPs involving land require the government to contribute the land
required for the infrastructure project and the private investor to raise the capital required
to build it. Private investors may use the land as collateral to borrow funds for the project,
and later recoup their expenditure through the sale, development or lease of land adjacent
to the project site. For this purpose, the amount of land contributed to the project typically
exceeds the actual amount required by the infrastructure itself.
Where the government does not own the land, it must first acquire it from private
owners, typically through the use of eminent domain. The use of eminent domain is highly
contentious particularly since the wordings of laws determining "fair compensation" tend
to be ambiguous in most countries. Thus outcomes could vary on a spectrum depending on
the state-society balance of power in that context. On one end, negotiations could favor the
private owner of land so that land is purchased at a market value that includes the market's
valuation of the future benefits to flow from planned infrastructure projects. This extreme
could in essence, negate or at least dissuade the use of this financing model. At the other
end of the spectrum, the acquisition could take place at current-use values or at
administratively set prices that favor the public sector.
Revenue sharing under land-based incentivized joint ventures typically sees public
and private owners entering into a voluntary gain-sharing agreement based on joint
ownership of the project. Revenues may be earned by sale of adjacent land or by exploiting
it as commercial or residential real estate as is the case for the Bangalore airport. China has
made extensive use of this model of financing. To finance a $730 million Outer Ring Road
around the city of Changsha, it transferred land use and development rights for two 200-
meter strips of land on both sides of the proposed highway to the Ring Road Corporation, a
public-private joint venture company. This was in addition to the land contributed for the
highway itself. Through the sale of leasing rights to parcels of land that would enjoy
infrastructure service, the Ring Road Corporation was able to raise half the amount of
money needed for investment. The other half of the money came from commercial loans
with the future anticipated value of the land as collateral. While, toll charges were also a
part of the financing package, land was central to the overall strategy (Peterson 2009, 67).
This mode of financing offers a range of benefits and improvements over other
mechanisms. For one, as described earlier, it allows governments to retain control over
their land in the longer term. In the case of the Bangalore airport for instance, while the
BIAL consortium enjoys the revenue and development rights to the project land for 30
years (with the option to renew for 30 years more) the land is still technically under lease
from the government for which it earns some nominal income (BIAL State Support
Agreement). More than the income however, it is the strategic importance of maintaining
control over land, especially that adjacent to sensitive infrastructure. Unfortunately
however, ownership of land might convey a false sense of control if the public sector can do
little to control activities on that land. It is important therefore that the terms of concession
agreements are well thought through as the opportunity cost of ceding control of
development rights to the land can be very high.
This tool is similar to the ones above in that it reduces public authorities'
dependence on debt. In this case, governments, who already have a natural advantage in
procuring land for public use or may own it already, do not have to make monetary
contributions but instead can leverage assets that they can most easily access. This is
especially useful for municipal governments who have limited borrowing powers such as
those in China and India. In return for this contribution they can then earn revenue or gain
an equity stake in the project.
Unlike land asset management, joint ventures ensure that land gains are channeled
towards productive investment. When properly exercised however, preferably in line with
an overall master plan for the city, this tool also serves an important role in directing
spatial growth of urban areas. As is the case with developer exactions, this tool also utilizes
market rationality in deciding the optimal level of infrastructure provision as it is expected
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that at least private developers would weigh their marginal revenue against the marginal
costs of construction.
As we will see in more detail later, this tool encounters a number of important
estimation problems such as the problem of determining the amount of excess land that
should be acquired. Further, since this tool is fundamentally a PPP it also encounters a
number of problems inherent to PPPs such as difficulty negotiating the division of returns
and accounting for all future contingencies. In this case however division and projections
are particularly troublesome since they are based on an asset whose valuation can he hard
to predict and establish. Incorrect estimation in this sphere could have far-reaching social
implications. This tool could also suffer from principal-agent problems as decisions over
the location of certain infrastructure projects can be made to maximize government and
developer revenue thus skewing the decision-making process. In their criticism of the
Indian urban planning system Morris and Pandey argue that the degree of regulation "puts
vast rents into the hands of politicians, favoured landowners and civil servants who know
the master plans even before they are formulated and can therefore take speculative
positions on land" (Morris and Pandey 2010, 6).
It is important to note that PPPs of various sorts have been troublesome in India
with governments allegedly choosing projects that generate more revenue over those that
offer services at lower costs. As Partha Mukhopadhyay (2008) has commented, "[The
government] must realize that infrastructure is not where you raise revenue; that is a
function for taxes. Infrastructure is where you spend those taxes, which then generates
more revenue through increased economic growth."
2.3 Underlying Assumptions of Land-Based Public Finance
Land-based public finance tools offer a host of advantages as described above.
However, their successful use and implementation is predicated on some basic
assumptions as outlined below. Assumptions can be defined as certain factors that these
tools take for granted will exist and also elements that the tools choose not to factor in to
their calculation matrices. While it would be simplistic to assume that the more explicit
assumptions are not examined in selecting and tailoring a particular tool for
implementation, it is the more implicit assumptions or expectations that can complicate
execution and lead to sub-optimal outcomes.
2.3.1 Land is an appropriate tool for finance
The use of land-based financing assumes that land is an appropriate vehicle for
finance. While this assumption might sound self-evident it is actually an important
assumption underlying the rationale for this medium of financing. Specifically, the
operative assumption is that land prices will tend to increase and not decrease given a
particular enhancement. For instance, it is assumed in the calculations of developer
exactions that the construction of offices or residences will increase surrounding land
prices when in actuality the resultant increase in the supply of office space or housing
could lower the projected sale price and thereby developer revenues. In making this
assumption most tools also discount the impact of other contingent factors. They also
assumes that land is perceived as a valuable asset and one that will reliably 'absorb' - in the
form of a higher land price - the capitalized value of the enhancement.
2.3.2 Increments can be estimated, captured and distributed in a non-
controversial and accurate way
Successful use of land-based tools hinges on the assumption that the exact value that
will get capitalized into land values can be estimated with accuracy. Thus betterment levies
assign differentiated taxes based on 'distance' from the source of enhancement. The tools
also assume that the capture and subsequent distribution of value will be uncontested so
that actual distribution matches theoretical 'fair' distribution resulting in a zero net welfare
outcome (See Section 2.4). This assumption implicitly states then that governments know
or can determine what a fair rate of return is, or have a rational and acceptable formula for
who should capture how much of any given increment. This assumption is essence
summarizes the ones described below that ignore the potential pitfalls in the estimation,
capture and distribution process.
2.3.3 Information is Perfect and Bargaining Power Symmetric
One of the main 'complicators' of estimation and distribution is the lack of
information and the inability to predict future changes in land prices and land use. In
countries with low levels of literacy, poor records and accountability and lack of
transparency in government, this problem is particularly acute. Barriers often exist that
privilege one group with more information than another. Many land-based tools however,
by virtue of their assumption of accuracy implicitly take for granted that information is
perfect and readily available. Beyond this, tools also assume that bargaining power is
symmetric. This latter assumption would imply that the outcome of the same negotiation,
repeated between different sets of actors, would yield the same distribution of returns
every time. Unfortunately however, as we will see in later chapters the terms and outcomes
of land acquisition deals can be markedly different based on who is at
the bargaining table and the extent to which they understand and are able to articulate
their rights in a given situation.
2.3.4 Government Rationality, Capacity and Master Planning
Most land-based tools put tremendous faith and emphasis on government
rationality and capability to evaluate, manage and execute all the steps of the land finance
process. In doing so these tools assume that government authorities enjoy a great deal of
legitimacy amongst their constituents and the institutional capacity and management
expertise to take on such projects.
As we saw above, a number of tools assume that to make the decisions they do
governments have a long-term and plan for city development and land use in mind that
they adhere to and that is available to everyone (as per 2.3.3 above). Moreover, they
suggest that these plans are long-term, stable and realistic and that a strong local planning
authority operates with uncontested power relative to developers, politicians and other
actors who have the capacity to subvert their plans. This assumption is critical as financing
tools that are based on plans that might never come to fruition might fail to generate the
revenue expected of them.
Most tools are predicated on the notion that decisions are made by 'rational'
governments acting in the public good and uninterested in their own selfish gain. To the
extent possible, it is also assumed that market 'rationality' is actually the deciding factor in
government authorities' decisions. Since some land-based financing occurs on market
terms (or almost market terms) ostensibly it correctly prices the cost of capital. Using
market signals it is assumed that governments can make more rational decisions than if
they were using transfers as their source of income. However, as the assumptions below
will highlight in more detail, government decisions are not always made on the basis of
economic rationality even though the information to do so exists; it is in ignoring the reality
of decision-making that the outcomes of tools can differ so drastically in theory and
implementation.
2.3.5 Political Insulation and "Transaction Costs"
Most theories of land-based financing pay little heed to the compulsions of political
contestation especially in populist diverse, democratic environments. Thus tools tend to
assume that bureaucracy, and decision-making is insulated from political pressure. Political
pressure might come from a relatively homogeneous group of citizens who protest the use
of particular tool. However this is quite different from situations where vote-seeking
politicians are looking to appeal to narrow interests for their own gain or where powerful
politician-developer nexuses exist that do not respect the independence or authority of the
bureaucracy.
2.3.6 Institutional Separation and Established Checks and Balances
As described above, land-based tools place tremendous faith in government
implementation and capacity. Beyond just competence however, these tools also assume
that institutions are appropriately structured to manage the financing process. As
mentioned before, even in situations where authority is well established, overlapping,
competing and continually evolving jurisdictions can complicate sharing of revenues and
create a principal-agent problem. As Peterson documents, the plan to finance Sao Paulo's
metro using the sale of development rights failed because the city government, who had
control over development rights was unwilling to use its leverage to raise revenues for
state government expenditure (Peterson 2009, 9). In the case of Mumbai, where
jurisdiction over land in the lucrative South Mumbai region is shared by both the regional
planning authority, the MMRDA, and the municipal government, MCGM, revenues from
large land sales are bitterly contested. In rural areas, where nascent, yet powerful, local
authority conflicts with that of the state, the implications might be altogether different.
Thus, land financing tools that assume the existence of clear and able hierarchies of
governance, with existing checks and balances, cannot reliably predict outcomes in such
different contexts.
2.3.7 Underlying System of Land: Land Laws, Acquisition Policy, Ownership
Patterns and Land Records
Since the tools are fundamentally based on land, they naturally make certain
important assumptions about the nature of this land itself.
For one, tools tend to imply that land markets are perfect and free from distortions
and structural inefficiencies. Thus they do not assume additional transaction costs,
imperfect capitalization or prices that reflect bad regulation or structural inefficiencies and
not demand and supply.
A second set of assumptions relates to information about land. Tools assume that
land records, prices, ownership and transactions are formal, transparent and have been
recorded over time so that this information can be used to predict future outcomes. As we
will see in more detail in Chapter 4 this is often not the case in India.
More importantly, many land-based tools also do address consider patterns of land
ownership, laws relating to property rights and land acquisition in a country when
determining their outcomes. In reality, all these factors can have very important
distributional implications. Land acquisition and its distributional outcomes for instance,
can have quite different ramifications for broader economic development and
intergenerational equity in situations where land ownership is concentrated with a small
elite, than when small, peasant or farmer holdings are the norm. While the tools
themselves, whose purpose is merely to raise the required finance for infrastructure, might
not need to consider these issues, policy makers might think about their implications when
making their choice of tools.
Historical practice in land markets takes years to reform. In India, it is common to
have both a legal (check, money transfer) payment for property together with an
undocumented cash settlement; the latter is often a significant share of the total sale price.
This system evolved partly to reduce the formal transaction amount and thus the incidence
of tax. For a host of reasons "benami" land ownership is also common whereby one person
lends their name to a property transaction while real ownership is vested with another
(Raghavan and Raghavan 2009). While it is simplistic to assume that policy makers do not
take this into account when developing their tools these facts are pointed out because the
tools themselves make no provision to address these underlying complications.
2.3.8 Cost of Externalities and Second Round Effects
Land-finance tools assume that there will be no externalities or second round effects
that will not be covered by the positive externalities generated. As an example, while
infrastructure might boost land values in an area, it might also push up housing prices for
new entrants to the market. Land based tools either assume that the losers will be
adequately compensated by the positive externalities generated or consider these costs
and actors irrelevant when making their distribution and revenue calculations.
2.3.9 Partial Capitalization and Time Lags
Some land-finance tools fail to account for time lags or market imperfections that
might not lead to full capitalization of the enhancement into land values. For instance, two
neighbors who purchased their homes ten years apart at different prices might be
compensated the same amount under eminent domain based on the current property
value. In reality, if the discounted value of the later purchase exceeds that of the prior
purchase then the older homeowner has been overcompensated. This is because the newer
homeowner paid for the increase in property prices while the older homeowner simply
enjoyed an increase in property price by virtue of time. Theoretically, this "capital gain"
should accrue to the government either through a capital gains tax or through a lower
compensation price to the older homeowner.
As we saw in the case of betterment levies, these tools also rarely account for
market imperfections that result in only partial capitalization of the infrastructure
investment into property prices.
2.3.10 Continually Increasing Land Values
As we saw with a number of tools above land-based finance in premised on the
notion that land prices will continue to increase. Yet as the example of China on page 20
demonstrated, in reality land prices cannot increase indefinitely and governments might
want to consider this eventuality.
2.4 Chapter Summary
The basic efficiency rationale for land-based finance is that while any infrastructure
investment will generate both positive and negative externalities, the positive externalities
will cover the costs of the negative externalities so that the net welfare effect is zero.
In reality, it is hard to develop a schematic for how land value increments should be
allocated and distributed. For one, issues like time lags complicate estimation so that some
of the gains that should accrue to the state might go to private landowners and vice versa.
Second, it is hard to determine who should be at the bargaining table when negotiation
distributions are decided and how much it is 'fair' for each party to receive. For instance, a
municipality that provided the basic sewerage and water lines for an area should
technically be included in increment distributions as theoretically they have contributed to
part of the increase in land values. Yet for administratively simplicity, some players might
be excluded. More commonly, one could think of situations where people who own land but
lack formal titles to it are excluded from settlements leading to overcompensation to other
parties. In terms of distribution the balance of power context under which compensation
negotiations for acquisition are conducted can greatly affect the magnitude of returns
enjoyed by each party (See Eminent Domain under 2.2.4). Further, administratively
determined regulations such as zoning and land use and the times at which these are
changed relative to compensation decisions can also complicate distribution so that overall
outcomes can differ quite significantly from one context to another (See Kirwan 1989, 291).
This chapter has outlined the principal methods of land-based finance being
considered by the Indian government and described their relative costs and benefits.
Chapter 3 will describe the fiscal structure and position of the Indian government to
highlight why in theory, land-based finance looks like an attractive and viable option for
the country.
CHAPTER 3: THE FISCAL STRUCTURE OF INDIAN FEDERALISM
This chapter outlines the fiscal structure, revenue sources and fiscal position of the
Indian Government. In doing so, it highlights the rationale for land-based public finance as
an option that seeks to overcome the resource constraints of a debt-laden government. The
chapter begins with a description of the three-tiered structure of governance in the country
and the principal sources of revenue at each level. Next it presents a snapshot of the overall
fiscal position of the country to stress the importance of developing alternate sources of
revenue going forward. The chapter concludes by developing a rationale for the prudent
use of land-based financing. Yet, just as the country's high debt to GDP ratio poses a threat
to long-term macroeconomic stability and sustainability so too can badly designed and
implemented land-based public finance schemes. While Chapter 4 will examine the actual
experience with a land-incentivized joint venture this chapter underscores the need to look
at other options carefully in light of the severe shortage of funds and explains why land-
based finance in theory, could be such an attractive prospect for India.
3.1 The Fiscal Structure of Indian Federalism
India is a Federal Constitutional Republic with the Constitution of India laying out
the functions, responsibilities and sources of revenue for the Union (Center), State, and
Local Governments. As a country of over 1.1 billion people spread over 28 States and 7
Union Territories it has a vast, complex and highly bureaucratic civic administration (CIA
World Factbook and Rao 2004, 3). When analyzing the fiscal structure of the Indian state it
is important to keep in mind that it was designed at the time of Independence in 1947
when there was a strong rationale against decentralization of power and governance. As a
result the structure concentrated financial power with the Union Government (also known
as Central or National Government).
With the decision to divide British India into two new countries - India and
Pakistan, the Indian National Congress - the political party responsible for drafting the
Constitution and forming the first independent government - feared for a 'Balkanization' of
the region. Moreover, they were tasked with the enormous responsibility for building the
physical and social infrastructure for a culturally, economically, socially and linguistically
diverse, predominantly rural and economically backward country. Thus a centrally-
controlled government structure was envisaged in which the Union Government held most
of the powers for revenue generation and expenditure (See Bardhan 1984, and Nayyar
1998). The Constitution listed "subjects" that were to be the domain of either the Central
or the State government. For example, while functions related to money supply, external
borrowing, international relations, atomic energy, international waterways and the like are
designated "Union Subjects", the fields of energy, education, health and family welfare and
urban infrastructure are the responsibility of individual State governments (Rao 2000: 11-
12). Naturally, as the economy has evolved and liberalized some of these assignments have
changed over the years. Nonetheless for the first 40-odd years after Independence the
governance structure evolved as primarily a two-tier structure - with States holding the
residual responsibilities of the Center (Ibid).
It was only in 1992 with the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments that an
attempt was made to establish and empower a third tier of governance - that of municipal
or local governments. These Amendments were made in recognition of the growing
importance of certain towns and cities and in recognition of the fact that greater
decentralization was needed to better address the demands of a heterogeneous and faster
growing polity. Despite having been instituted over 20 years ago, till date very few local
governments wield any real power (See RBI Report 2007 and Garg 2007, 113).
Informally, some level of decentralized authority had existed below the State level
for a long time in both rural and urban areas. However, the Amendments formally
mandated the creation of panchayats1 6 at the village, taluk (block) and district levels. In
urban areas this legislation entailed the creation of Municipal Corporations, Municipalities
and Notified Area Committees to provide urban services depending on the population of
the area (Sridhar and Reddy 2009, 8). The Amendments laid out 18 subjects ranging from
urban planning and slum improvement to secondary and adult education that they
expected fully functioning and empowered city municipalities to manage. However, since
the decision to actually devolve these responsibilities and grant revenue collecting powers
lay with individual State governments very few urban local bodies have actually been
16 Literally means assembly (yat) of five (panch) respected elders chosen and accepted by the
village community.
empowered as envisioned by the Central Government (Rao 2004, 7). With the exception of
the Mumbai and New Delhi Municipal Corporations that own and manage a large asset base
almost all urban local bodies (ULBs) suffer from an acute shortage of financial resources
and are perpetually dependent on State Government grants. The situation is even worse for
rural local governments. Since India is primarily a rural country, of the more than quarter
of a million local governments only around 3,000 are in urban areas (ibid.).
3.1.1 State Government Revenues
State Governments in India enjoy a much stronger financial position and have a
longer history and capacity in governance.
In terms of revenue generation, the States have tax handles of land revenue, tax on
agricultural income and wealth (although this is rarely levied), stamp duties and
registration fees, tax on sale and purchase of goods, excise duties on sale of alcoholic
products, tax on motor vehicles, tax on goods and passengers transported through the
roads and inland waterways. Traditionally, the tax on sale and purchase of goods has been
the most remunerative. All residuary tax powers lie with the Center (Rao 2000, 12).
To supplement tax revenue, States can also borrow from the market as well as from
the Union Government. This has resulted in almost all the States being heavily indebted to
the Center. The Union Ministry of Finance, the Reserve Bank of India and the Planning
Commission regulate State borrowing from the Center. States may also borrow from Public
Accounts that comprise small savings accounts (net collections from investment in national
savings certificates) and savings in the Public Provident Funds (Rao 2000, 12-13).
Lastly, the Center also arranges for direct transfer offunds to States by tax
devolution and grants in aid. These transfers are determined by a Finance Commission that
is appointed every five years. The National Planning Commission also provides sizeable
assistance to States as a mix of grants and loans to finance development plans. Central
Ministries also entirely fund the Central schemes that they ask States to implement in their
respective constituencies. A few Ministries however, require matching contributions from
the States (Rao 2000, 13).
Although the Center is tasked to control deficits incurred by the States their laxity
has allowed States to further supplement their revenue streams through four main
channels as outlined by Rao (2000, 19)
(i) Creating contingent liabilities by establishing separate corporations to
implement major projects undertaken by the States and financing these
through borrowing from the market rather than from their own resources
(ii) Borrowing from the public enterprises they own in times of need
(iii) Borrowing from the Public Account, and
(iv) Borrowing from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).
With the advent of liberalization reform in 1991, the Government of India (GOI)
deregulated interest rates and disallowed borrowing from the RBI. This had the impact of
increasing interest rates and thus the associated interest burden for States (Garg 2007,
119). Moreover, while the fiscal position of most States was quite comfortable until 1991
since then there has been a steady increase in deficits both at the State and Central level
(ibid.) Unfortunately, there are not enough statutory checks and balances in the system to
enforce fiscal prudence amongst States and a number of structural features of the system
create a moral hazard issue whereby States have few incentives to manage their finances
since they can rely so heavily on the Central Government (Sen 2003, 146).
3.1.2 Municipal Government Revenues
Although there are a number of constitutionally mandated source of revenue for
Municipal Governments many of them have not been granted access to these sources by
their State Governments. Octroi, used to be the principal revenue source for municipalities,
but it has been largely abolished over the years (Garg 2007, 122-125). Some States
compensate for this with a surcharge on sales tax or simply by granting municipalities a
certain share of their revenue. Most municipalities are allowed to collect property tax
although each individual State Government determines the specific method of assessment.
About half of the States allow municipalities collect a "Profession Tax" while almost all
States pass on some share of the Entertainment and Advertisement Taxes they collect.
Minor taxes such as water, lighting, animal, boat and toll tax are granted to municipalities.
Based on the recommendations of the Eleventh Finance Commission, the Central
Government also provides grants for urban local bodies and State governments also
provide block grants for general purposes and grants for specific purposes (ibid.).
Despite this, revenue remains woefully inadequate for Municipal Governments.
More recently some of them started experimenting with user charges for some basic
services. This has not typically been common practice in India. Others have turned to
public-private partnerships for projects that involve large-scale investment like solid waste
management. As market-oriented reforms have liberalized their borrowing potential some
Municipal Governments have begun to supplement their finances with market borrowing
and wealthier, more established municipalities such as Ahmedabad have even begun
issuing municipal bonds. Market borrowing by municipalities has to be underwritten by
the State however, which adds to the latter's contingent liability (Garg 2007, 126).
3.2 Fiscal Position of State and National Governments
National debt to GDP ratios in India stood at 78% in 2008-09. This figure is
significantly higher than the average for emerging economies which stands at 45% of GDP.
As mentioned above, the overall level of public debt has increased since 1991 (See Figure
3.1). Between 1991 and 2009, public debt has ranged between 68 to 87 percent of GDP,
with an average of 78 percent of GDP (Topalova and Nyberg 2010, 16).
Figure 3.1: Total Government Fiscal Deficits and Debt Share of GDP
Source: CIEC and IMF Staff Calculations. Topavala and Nyberg 2010, 17
Recognizing the danger to macroeconomic stability that such high debt ratios pose,
the Indian Government has undertaken two periods of substantial fiscal consolidation since
1991 - once in the first half of the 1990s and again in 2003 after the introduction of the
Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBMA). While both periods of
consolidation were successful in reducing the debt share of GDP by several percentage
points (11 and 6 points respectively) both positions were reversed due to subsequent
economic slowdowns, soaring subsidies and mandated increases in government pay
(Topalova and Nyberg 2010, 16). What is all the more worrying from a 'quality' of debt
perspective is that as the economy has grown over the last few years economic growth has
not been synonymous with a reduction in debt levels (See Figure 3.2 for how India
compares with other countries on this trend). After accounting for enough of a time lag this
should suggest that debt expenditure is not being funneled towards productive uses. Data
shows that this inference is true. After accounting for loans and advances provided by the
Central government, average capital expenditure by both levels of government is only
about 3.5 percent of GDP, which in 2002-2003 was roughly Rs 880 billion (USD 19 billion)
(Garg 2007,119).
Figure 3.2: Cross-Country Comparison of Real Growth and Reduction of Public Debt Trends
Reed Gwthf and Redctin oftiubKi Debct
Source: Topalova and Nyberg 2010, 14. Fitted Line from source document.
Previous fiscal consolidations were aided by a negative interest growth differential
(See Figure 3.3). As the economy grows and matures and the gap between interest rates
and growth rates narrow (as they have in more developed economies) sustaining such high
levels of debt will become even more difficult in the long term. Thus Topalova and Nyberg
suggest that India take steps to reduce its debt share of GDP to 60 percent by 2015-16
(Topalova and Nyberg 2010, 3). They suggest that maintaining a debt ceiling of 65 percent
(a figure that is at least lower than the historical average minus one standard deviation)
would demonstrate the Indian government's commitment to fiscal consolidation (ibid., 17).
The primary avenues through which they recommend the government attain this goal are
revenue reform (reducing tax evasion), subsidy reform and privatization (Topalova and
Nyberg 2010, 18).
Figure 3.3: Relationship between GDP Growth and Interest on Debt
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The situation at the State level is worse. States are still highly dependent on the
Central Government with the dependence of high-income states at around 36 percent, low-
income states at almost 62 percent and 'special category states' at 77 percent for (Rao
2000, 25). Moreover, almost half of all States use more than 50 percent of their revenue
base for meeting interest obligations and retirement payments. There are a number of
reasons for this dire fiscal position. As Bagchi (2001) describes "poor accountability" as a
result of weak monitoring of government finances and arms-length State administration of
local activities has allowed for large leakages in the system (17). "Competitive populism"
has enlarged the subsidy budget of the government so that in 1998-99, budgetary subsidies
formed nearly thirteen percent of GDP, 9 percent of which came from the states (Bagchi
2001, 16). Large and persistent losses in inefficient public sector enterprises have further
deepened this position (Ibid). Despite steps to bring about greater fiscal responsibility,
demands on the State are only increasing. Recent commitments to bring in employment
guarantee legislation and other welfare programs means that asking state governments to
increase their outlay on urban infrastructure dramatically would be quite unrealistic (Garg
2007, 121).
Overall, the Central Government acknowledges that there is an "asymmetry" in
decentralization of expenditures and revenues (Rao 2000, 15). Thus while Central
Governments exercise control over one-third of revenues as expenditure, they raise two-
thirds of all revenue in the country.
3.3 The Rationale for Land-Based Financing of Urban Infrastructure
In light of the dire fiscal position of the government, the question of how the country
is going to finance the massive expenditure required for urban infrastructure development
is particularly worrying. Moreover, as the Central Government continues to push for
greater decentralization, State and Municipal governments will be increasingly asked to
generate the funds required for investment without relying on the Central Government. As
responsibilities for city infrastructure - water and sewerage, electrical services, bus
services, area and road development, development of new housing areas/sub-cities,
cleanliness and street lighting - are increasingly passed on to Municipal Governments,
State Governments will have to step in to some of the arenas previously funded by the
Center. Particularly relevant to this thesis is the fact that as the scale of total national
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investment required increases, State Governments have been called upon to finance
regional-level infrastructure, such as airports, ports and docks.
Under the current system urban infrastructure is funded by states as follows (See Garg
2007, 128-134):
(i) Central Government Grants: These are targeted central plan schemes
implemented with the relevant State/Municipal government and the
concerned Central Ministry. They focus on one particular type of
infrastructure e.g. resettlement of slums. The outlay on these is relatively
small and they cannot be relied on to address the larger problems into
which these smaller initiatives fall, e.g. housing.
(ii) Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO): As a
completely central government owned non-banking finance company
HUDCO funds specialized state agencies for urban infrastructure projects.
(iii) Infrastructure Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) and
Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited (ILFS): Both are
set up by the Central Government with equity participation from the State
Bank of India and others to provide concept-to-end solutions for urban
infrastructure projects. These institutions are likely to increase in
importance in the new context.
(iv) State Level Municipal Finance Agencies: These are agencies, such as the
Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development and Finance Corporation
(KUIDFC) and the Tamil Nadu Urban Infrastructure Financial Services
Limited (TNUIFS) that serve as nodal corporations to manage, finance
and advise externally-aided or State-initiated urban infrastructure
projects.
(v) World Bank, Japanese Bank for International Cooperation, French
International Development Agency and others: These agencies fund
and advise local and State governments on urban infrastructure projects.
As can be seen, all the options above either rely on Central Government funding or
borrowing from external agencies. In this context, land-based finance offers tremendous
potential to supplement the budgets of State and Municipal governments by offering a
buoyant, dynamic and debt-free financing option.
As described in Chapter 2, land-based finance substantially overcomes the current
fiscal constraints attendant on State and Local governments. For one, it offers the
opportunity to reduce the reliance on debt by generating revenue up-front or soon after
project completion. As more and more government bodies are looking to public private
partnerships to partially defray their investment burden these tools allow them to
participate in profitable projects without making a monetary contribution and freeing
up their budget for other expenditure. Moreover, it allows them to manage and
streamline their asset holdings by disposing off those assets that are not earning them a
significant enough return or that are generating additional liabilities to maintain. Indian
government authorities are particularly advantaged in this respect since past legislation
has encouraged large-scale accumulation of land assets by all levels of government.
Unlike outright privatization land-based finance allows government authorities to
retain some degree of control over the infrastructure provided if that is what they desire.
This is important from both an equity and national security point of view.
These tools reduce dependence on the Center so that the Union Government can
focus on reducing their fiscal debt. Land-based finance also overcomes the inherent moral
hazard problems that come with transfer-based revenue systems thus injecting greater
rationality in spending into the economy as a whole.
Lastly, land-based finance is particularly suited to the rapidly urbanizing context
of India today. Demand for land has resulted in startling increases in land values over the
last decade thus making this source of revenue a potentially very lucrative one.
3.4 Chapter Summary
If correctly implemented then, land-based finance can work in all the ways
described above to ameliorate the current fiscal position of the State and National
governments while strengthening capacity and budgets at the municipal level. Yet while it
appears that the government is almost compelled to move in this direction in order to meet
the infrastructure requirement it is important to first evaluate the performance of these
tools in practice. Thus while Chapter 3 highlighted all the potential gains that could come
from using well-designed and implemented land-based finance tools, Chapter 4 will
describe actual outcomes in the case of the BIA to determine the actual costs and benefits
that might be involved in using a land-incentivized joint venture.
CHAPTER 4: THE BANGALORE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
This chapter explores the details of the project to build the Bangalore International
Airport. Land, in the form of a contribution from the State Government of Karnataka
through its implementing agency, the KSIIDC, was the primary financing element for the
airport. The chapter begins with a brief overview of the economy and politics of Bangalore
and the recent changes in India's national civil aviation policy that made public-private
partnerships of this kind possible in the first place. The chapter goes on to present the
available details of the case and then uses the framework developed in Chapter 2 to
examine whether the fundamental assumptions and tenets of land-based finance (and
specifically land-incentivized joint ventures) hold up in reality. As described above as I am
limited in the concrete information I have on the case the facts are presented mainly to use
to highlight instances where the underlying assumptions of many of these tools can be
compromised in reality. With the information available I cannot establish the degree to
which the project was a failure or success nor credibly establish the extent to which the
opinions and reports cited are true and unbiased.
4.1 Bangalore: Economy and Politics
Bangalore, the capital city of the southern state of Karnataka, is India's second
fastest growing region and the heart of the country's famed and booming information
technology (IT) industry. In the 1990s, it was primarily the extraordinary growth story of
this city - dubbed the "Silicon Valley" of India - that catapulted India and Indian
entrepreneurs to the world stage. Today, Bangalore accounts for more than one-third of
India's USD 31 billion IT exports (Ramesh 2007). In 2008 Bangalore was ranked the fifth
largest city-contributor to national GDP, and with a growth rate that has averaged 10.3
percent over the past seven years, this trend looks set to continue (Rediff 2008). A 2008
Ernst and Young study pegged Bangalore and Mumbai as the next top centers of global
investment (Rediff 2009).
IT industry legends Wipro, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) and Infosys have based
their sprawling headquarters within the city's two major IT Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
- Whitefield and Electronics City. Not only are these firms India's three biggest IT giants but
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they also rank among the top ten IT firms globally in terms of stock market capitalization,
gross profits and employees (The Economist 2005). Beyond IT, Bangalore is also home to
almost half the 256 biotechnology firms in the country including the homegrown global
powerhouse Biocon that earned revenues of USD 525 million in 2010 alone ((The Hindu
2004 & Biocon Press Release). "Call Centers" or Business Process Outsourcing units for
multi-national corporations (MNCs) are another major industry in the city. Many MNCs also
take advantage of the Export Promoting Zones of Whitefield to set up their manufacturing
operations. Over the years the city has developed a unique entrepreneurial culture that
spawns hundreds of new small to medium-sized enterprises every year.
Prior to the IT boom, Bangalore was known for its colleges and research universities
particularly the prestigious Indian Institute of Science. Due to its distance from China and
Pakistan and its primacy as an academic center, the city was also chosen to house several
public sector heavy industries, and the bulk of the sensitive aerospace, telecommunications
and defense facilities. Popular for its cool climate and vast open spaces, Bangalore had
earned the title of India's "Garden City".
In terms of demographics, Bangalore is the country's third most populous city with an
estimated 2010 population of almost seven million (World Gazetteer17). The city had a
literacy rate of 75 percent in 2001, which is significantly higher than the national average
of 65.4 percent and the state average of 66.6 percent (Sridhar and Reddy 2009, 48). With
growth has come increased affluence and the city is second only to Mumbai in the number
of resident dollar millionaires (The Economist 2005).
Behind the glitz of the "Bangalore Dream" however lies a more conflicted reality. As Olivier
Toutain and S. Gopiprasad (2006) explain, Bangalore suffers from many of the institutional
and principal-agent problems described in Chapter 2:
Without the full implementation of the 74 CAA, many of the authorities designated
to plan today wear the caps of a planner and a developer simultaneously. This dual
role magnifies urban problems as physical development supersedes planning
concerns. This is largely driven by the fact that the authorities have inadequate
budgetary support from the state.
Provision of sites and service schemes (real estate activity) contributes to funding
their day-to-day operations. Real estate activities include transactions of land-
17 Available at http://www.world-gazetteer.com/wg.php?x=&men=gcis&lng=en&dat=80&geo=-
104&srt=pnan&col=aohdq&msz=1500&va=&pt=a accessed August 17, 2010.
acquisition of land, development and sale of sites/plots, which distort land markets.
Rarely do development activities cater to the market demand. As a result, a number
of private land sub-divisions (layouts) crop up as affordable sites with partial or no
infrastructure in place, without necessary planning compliance. These lead to the
formation of 'illegal layouts'.
The weak land laws, rules and regulations work at cross- purposes and support the
formation of different types of land tenures. Nearly 30 per cent of Bangalore is
developed in such manner. On the other side, through unrealistic regulation of
restrictions on land occupation in the core area along with segregated land use,
encourages quite often, the violation of rules and un-authorized construction (62).
Moreover, in recent years, ideological clashes between the city's IT moguls, and
different factions within the State Government have come to a head. Riding on their success
in putting Bangalore on the world stage and in bringing millions of dollars of foreign
investment, business leaders have put tremendous pressure on the State Government to
improve the city's infrastructure or risk losing their business. Indeed, uncertainty about the
government's commitment to improving this situation has led many MNCs in the city to
work on a "plug and pull" concept, leasing or renting property and making only marginal
investments so they can move out of the city at any time (India Today 2005). At the same
time, there is a significant portion of the urban electorate resent what they see as
preferential treatment to the business elite in terms of investment priorities, the granting
of tax breaks and assistance in land acquisition. The latter voices are somewhat allied with
an electoral base in rural Karnataka - poor farmers with small holdings who would rather
see greater investment in rural programs than urban (See Ghosh 2006). As Chief Ministers
pick sides to gain political mileage, State Government priorities have oscillated. When the
urban residents demanded an upgrade in civic facilities after a particularly bad monsoon,
the pro-farmer Chief Minister Dharam Singh responded "We need the rains, and we have
them," he said. "We are pro-poor, pro-farmer and cannot dream of making Bangalore a
Singapore unless we address the realities." (India Today 2005).
Yet despite these politics, there is little denying the dire need for investment in
Bangalore's urban infrastructure. Within the campuses of the large companies, Wipro,
Infosys and the three clusters into which the IT industry is divided - Software Technology
Parks of India (STPI); International Tech Park, Bangalore (ITPB); and Electronics City, the
infrastructure is privately provided and of excellent quality. It is traveling between these
enclaves that proves incredibly problematic. Bangalore suffers from a severe lack of basic
infrastructure common to most Indian cities: a water shortage, inadequate sewers, an
erratic power supply, and pot-holed roads stretched far beyond their capacity (See The
Economist 2005). As the famously pro-IT Former Chief Minister of Karnataka S.M. Krishna,
expressed "The success of India's hi-tech and outsourcing industry was scripted in
Bangalore, but the city has now become a victim of its own success" (India Today 2004).
On the issue of the airport however, there seemed little disagreement as to the
necessity of an international airport for Bangalore and the surrounding area. Given the
scale of financing required for the project and as per the new civil aviation policy this
project would be implemented at the State level. The Government of Karnataka chose its
wholly-owned principal investment arm, the Karnataka State Industrial Investment and
Development Corporation (KSIIDC) to act as a partner in this project.
The KSIIDC was originally established as the Mysore Small Industries Corporation,
and provided financial services to encourage the development of small-scale industries in
Karnataka (KSIIDC website). From 1960 however, as its responsibilities evolved to the
setting up of industrial estates and other medium-size industry services 18 the name KSIIDC
was adopted. As primarily a financing institution, in 1996 the KSIIDC began to get involved
in the debt financing of large infrastructure projects like cement, steel and mining in the
state (Shenoy 2010).
However, at the time the airport project was floated in the early 2000, the KSIIDC
was deeply in debt. In 2004, KSIIDC's equity holding in various companies was about Rs
300 crores (USD 65 million) while its loan portfolio was a staggering Rs 2,000 crores (USD
436 million) of which over 50 percent was non-performing assets (Raghavendra 2004).
KSIIDC's accumulated losses were at Rs 350 crores (USD 76 million) (ibid.). Moreover,
KSIIDC owed nearly Rs 600 crores (USD 130 million) to the Small Industries Development
18 Amongst its other early functions, the KSIIDC website lists procurement and distribution of raw
materials, assistance towards marketing, dissemination of information by participating in the
internal and international exhibitions, supply of machinery under hire purchase scheme, providing
guidance to SSI entrepreneurs and providing technical library facilities.
Bank of India (SIDBI) and IDBI - both major Indian development banks. It had proposed to
IDBI the paying back of loans worth Rs 400 crores (USD 87 million) in three installments
and has asked for an interest waiver (ibid.). Given this precarious financial situation, the
State Government decided that as part of the revival strategy, KSIIDC should change its
approach to act as a nodal agency promoting projects on a PPP basis rather than as a lender
(ibid.). At the time of the deal the KSIIDC would not have had the money to build the airport
from their own finances (John 2005, 1016).
As a result of this restructuring, over the past few years the KSIIDC has changed its
role to promoting major infrastructure projects undertaken on a PPP basis and providing
the supporting infrastructure for the same (Shenoy 2010). In recognition of this fact, in
March 2010, a decision was taken to rename it the Karnataka Stake Industrial and
Infrastructure Development Corporation, although the abbreviation KSIIDC remains the
same (ibid.).
Another reason that land formed such a large part of the financing deal was the new
national civil aviation policy drafted in 2006. The next section will briefly touch on the
important developments in civil aviation policy in India that made this form of PPP
possible.
4.2 Airports and Civil Aviation Policy in India
The landscape of civil aviation in India has changed dramatically in the last 15 years.
The first big change came with the landmark 1994 Civil Aviation reform that allowed
private players into the airline industry - a move that resulted in a sharp drop in air fares,
made air travel more affordable to the middle class and spurred the massive increase in air
traffic witnessed today (See Bhadra 2008). In the years 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004- 05,
the passenger movement at the 126 airports managed by the Airports Authority of India
(AAI) increased by 9.96%, 10.69% and 21.6% respectively and cargo movement by 15%,
8.75% and 19.9% respectively (Government of India (GOI) 2006, 4). By 2006 when the
national Committee on Infrastructure commissioned a Task Force to develop a financing
plan for airports they did so assuming an annual traffic growth of 16% up to 2010 (ibid.).
The Airports Authority of India has a nationwide projection of 6% growth year-on-year
from 2012-2017 (Policy on Airport Infrastructure of India 2002, 8). A recent report by
Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation (CAPA) states that over the next 12 years, India's Ministry
of Civil Aviation (MoCA) is aiming at 500 operational airports (GOI 2009, 2).
In 2005, an Empowered Sub-Committee of the Prime Minister's Committee on
Infrastructure decided to set up a Task Force to deliberate the best means of financing the
upgrading, modernization and construction of India's airports. The Committee recognized
the huge obstacle the lack of airport and other infrastructure posed to the growth of the
Indian economy. In 2006, the designated Task Force presented a Rs 40,000 crores (USD 8.7
billion) investment plan (See GOI 2006). Of this amount, it was assumed that approximately
Rs 31,000 (USD 6.7 billion) would come from public-private partnerships in which the
private partners would be responsible for management as well as construction of the
facilities (ibid., 14). Revenue would be shared between the government and the private
parties on the basis of a negotiated concession agreement. This landmark move reflects a
shift in thinking of airports as pure infrastructure to businesses that earn a significant
share of their revenue from non-aeronautical sources. Privatization of airports was also
authorized on the belief that it would induce efficiency in airport management and take
some of the burden of investing off the government (Ohri 2009, 13). Until this point,
airports in India had been entirely funded and managed using the internally generated
returns of the AAI with almost negligible reliance on external assistance, debt and equity.
Moreover, non-aeronautical revenues19 formed only 22% of total revenue even at some of
the busiest airports (Ohri 2009,7).
Recognizing that private investment would be forthcoming initially only for larger
metro city airports, the new airport plan calls for greenfield airports to be built in
Bangalore, Hyderabad as well as for modernization and expansion of existing airports in
Chennai, Delhi, Kolkata, and Mumbai (Peterson 2009). Greenfield airports under PPP
agreements would follow the shareholding pattern of BIAL with 74% equity from private
entities, 13% from AAI (subject to a cap of Rs. 500 crores per airport) and 13% from the
respective State Government (GOI 2006, 12-13). The airports would typically be built
19 The bulk of revenue in Indian airports comes from aeronautical sources e.g. landing fees. Most
international airports derive up to sixty percent of their revenue from non-aeronautical sources e.g.
shops, restaurants and other commercial development (Ohri 2009, 16).
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under BOT contracts with 30-year terms and an option for renewal. Small, less lucrative
non-Metro airports would continue to be funded and managed by the AAI (ibid.)
In keeping with the aim to make airports lucrative business propositions, it was
recommended that State Governments acquire and provide subsidized real estate and
airport land to private developers. Developers would then be able to exploit some part of
the land for commercial purposes (Ohri 2009, 2). This in-kind contribution would also
allow State Governments to earn equity in the project without making monetary
contributions. The Task Force determined that User Development Fees (UDF) were not an
appropriate form of project finance and should be used only as a last resort when all
attempts at PPP financing were exhausted. It was decided that UDFs also made air travel
more expensive and less accessible to the common person (GOI 2006, 14). However, In
order to increase private interest in development of airport infrastructure, private
providers would be allowed to finance up to 20% of their capital costs through capital
grants or 'viability gap funding' under the national scheme for support to PPPs in
infrastructure (GOI 2006, 15)20.
4.3 The BIAL Case
The plan for a new airport for Bangalore was originally conceived of back in 1991
and Devanahalli, a plot 30 km outside of Bangalore was chosen for the purpose. At the time,
Bangalore was served only by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) Bangalore Airport.
The HAL airport was built in 1964 and could handle approximately 7.5 million passengers a
year - a capacity deemed grossly inadequate even in 1991 to accommodate Bangalore's
rapidly growing needs. Moreover, the HAL airport was primarily a domestic airport
although in 1997 it began to handle a limited portion of international flights. As the city
grew it became increasingly clear that a growing international business hub like Bangalore
needed more connections with the rest of India and directly with the rest of the world.
In 1994, the Government of Karnataka began to invite global bids for construction of
the airport under a Build Operate and Transfer (BOT model), and in 1998, a consortium led
by the Indian conglomerate Tata Sons was selected to build the airport. Eventually, for a
20 I was unable to find information on a guaranteed rate of return (ROR) for private investors in the
draft Civil Aviation Policy, the Concession Agreement or other sources.
number of reasons - including delays and disagreements over closure of the HAL airport -
the deal fell through (Saraswati 2001: 131).
Acquisition of an identified 4,200 acres of land in Devanahalli had already begun in
1998. Following the breakdown of the Tata agreement the State government initiated the
bid process again, and received seven eligible contenders including another major Indian
industrial house, Reliance Industries, in partnership with Singapore's Changi Airport (ibid.).
In 2002 a Shareholder Agreement was signed with the current consortium 21.
By 2002 India was a remarkably different economy than it had been in 1991 or even
1998. Economic liberalization reform that began in 1991 had picked up pace; restrictions
on Foreign Direct Investment had been eased, national income levels had risen creating a
new middle class with more disposable income than before, and GDP growth had averaged
8.5 percent over the six years spanning 2003-2009 as compared to its long-run annual
growth rate of 6.6 over 1989-2009 (Panagariya 2008, 1). Indeed, it had been against this
very backdrop of increased integration and openness to the world economy that the
Bangalore success story had taken off. Most importantly, as described above, the face of
civil aviation in the country had changed and important changes were afoot that put
infrastructure development at the forefront of the government's agenda for growth.
4.3.1 Terms of the Agreement
The Bangalore International Airport would be the country's first largely privately
owned greenfield airport. Under the terms of the State Support Agreement signed January
20, 2005, the consortium formed to execute the project would be called Bangalore
International Airport Limited (BIAL). This consortium comprised the Government of
Karnataka (represented by KSIIDC) with 13% equity, AAI (13% equity), Siemens Project
Ventures (40% equity), Larsen & Toubro (17% equity) and Zurich Airport (17% equity)
(John 2006, 1015). The consortium has the right to design, develop, finance, construct,
operate and manage the airport for a period of 30 years from the opening date with an
option to extend the concession by another 30 years (See BIAL State Support Agreement).
In accordance with the new Aviation Bill of 2006 no new or existing airport would be
allowed within an aerial distance of 150 kilometers of an existing airport (ibid.). This meant
21 I do not have information on the criteria on which the bid was selected.
that the old HAL airport would have to be closed. To enhance the "viability" and
"bankability" of the project, the State Government of Karnataka, through its appointed
agency KSIIDC, would provide the airport land of 4,050 hectares free from all
encumbrances (ibid.). Under the terms of the Land Lease Agreement (executed on June 20,
2005) KSIIDC is the owner of the land and will lease it out to BIAL at a cost of Re. 1 from the
day of land delivery to the airport opening date, and thereafter as a percentage of the total
land acquisition cost of Rs 175 crores (USD 38 million) according to the schedule - 3
percent for the first 7 years, 6 percent for the 8th year, and thereafter a sum equaling the
rent of the preceding year plus 3 percent (See Land Lease Agreement 2005). Moreover, the
government would make available to the consortium state support of Rs. 350 Crore (USD
77m) for the purpose of the project (Brenner 2007, 227). This was in the form of an
interest-free loan payable at the end of 10 years. At the time of signing the agreement the
airport was to be built for a capacity of 4.5 million passengers at an estimated cost of
1,411.79 crores (USD308 million) (ibid.). Realizing this capacity would be inadequate by
the time the project opened, this was upgraded to 11.4 million at a projected cost of
1,930.29 crores (USD 421 million) (ibid.). The redesign resulted in an increase in the size of
the terminal, the number of aircraft stands, new taxiway layouts and supporting
infrastructure.
In keeping with revenue structures across the world where 60 to 70 percent of
revenue to airport operators is generated from non-aeronautical sources, the agreement
made provisions for the exploitation of the commercial potential of the airport so that the
facility was only viable but also capable of generating enough profits for expansion and
development in the future (See GOI 2006 and Ohri 2009). To ensure this, the BIAL
consortium will have almost half of the 4,050 acres to develop as commercial space from
which they can earn rental income. Moreover, there will be total freedom from Government
control for them to raise revenue from commercial activities. The non-aeronautical
activities approved under the agreement include the development of hi-tech parks, hotels,
industrial parks, golf courses, IT parks and production centers amongst other activities
specified in the State Support Agreement.
4.3.2 Land Acquisition
As per the agreement, the State Government was required to acquire the airport
land for the consortium. The Indian "Land Acquisition Act" allows government authorities
to acquire privately held land if it is deemed to be necessary for a project of "public
purpose". Originally written in 1894, and largely unchanged since, the Act has proved
deeply contentious in recent years and serious proposals for its amendment are currently
being debated although nothing has been passed into law yet. As per the Act, the 'requiring
body' places a request for land acquisition before the government who is represented by
the area's district collector. The district collector then studies the plan and decides on its
approval. If approval is granted, the land losers are notified, their land measured and
compensation calculated. By law, even if the land losers are not satisfied with the terms, the
district collector might acquire the land if the terms are to his satisfaction. While land
losers may legally approach courts for redressal, this alternative has offered little comfort
as the judicial process in India is notoriously slow (Asif 1999, 1564). With the judicial
process offering little hope, most disgruntled landowners have turned to vote-seeking
politicians or local militias to safeguard their rights - a process that favors strong-arm
tactics over negotiation and creates long project delays and often lop-sided outcomes.
Using this act, KSIIDC eventually acquired more than 4,500 acres of land from
private owners in Devanahalli 22. As per the records, compensation paid to most
landowners was approximately Rs 4-6 lakh (USD 8,732 - 13,098) per acre or less than Rs
13.5 (USD 30 cents) per square foot (John 2005, 1016). Those who lost homes were also
granted a site in addition to monetary compensation but largely relocated to distant areas
(Shivanand and Srivatsa 2008 and John 2006). Ninety percent of the land acquired was
designated as agricultural land and comprised small land holdings of usually an acre or less
each. The majority of landowners were poor farmers who lived off the land as their main
source of livelihood. In total more than 2,000 farmers in about 13 villages were displaced
(ibid.). Hundreds of these farmers were "unauthorized cultivators" who had cultivated the
land for decades yet did not possess formal land ownership documents. According to
Karnataka Prantha Raitha Sangha (KPRS) State General Secretary G.C. Bayya Reddy,
22 The exact amount of land acquired is not known as will be seen below.
"Cultivation on much of this government land was on the verge of being regularised. The
applications were suddenly rejected when the airport plans materialized" (Gandhi 2009).
As a result, hundreds of these farmers were displaced without any compensation at all.
It has been alleged that plans to choose this site were known to many politicians and
others with access to policy-making circles, which resulted in many speculators entering
the market for surrounding land (DNA 2009). By 2007 it was estimated that areas
surrounding Devanahalli had registered between 66 to 166 percent increases in residential
land values (Deccan Herald 2007). A large part of this increase was due to the state
government issuing a post-acquisition Non Agricultural Use Clearance (NAC) for the
surrounding land that fueled a massive real estate bubble in the area. Thus, while some
poor families in adjacent areas and particularly those along land acquired for an access
road to the airport, were able to profit from selling their plots at astronomical prices, the
vast majority of original landowners were displaced and compensated at the pre-inflation
and pre-change in land use price (Times of India 2008).
4.3.3 Project Execution
Construction work on the airport began on July 2, 2005 and after a few minor delays
the airport opened on May 23, 2008. Estimates of the final project cost vary with some
sources putting it at Rs 2,470 crores (USD 539 million) (One India 2009). A 2007
breakdown of costs published by Albert Brunner, the then CEO of BIAL lists the final
contributions and equity as below (Brunner 2007, 228).
Figure 4.1: Shareholding and Contributions
Investor Amount (in Rs Equity Stake
millions)
KSIIDC 3,500 13%
AAI Not given 13%
BIAL 74%
Equity Contribution 3,270
Debt from Lenders 11,850
Internal Accrual/Security 680
TOTAL 19,300
Source: Brunner 2007
Note: The lack of consistency in the amount of contribution by the consortium and the total project
cost from public sources may lead to slight discrepancies in the figures cited through the text.
Therefore the conclusions presented are tentative.
Within the first 100 days of operation, Albert Bruner, CEO of BIAL noted a 30
percent increase in international airlines and airfreight carriers into the city (The Hindu
2008). He also noted that despite being built with a capacity of 11 million the airport could
accommodate passenger traffic of 15 million without further investment in infrastructure.
At the 100-day mark, passenger flow was already 11.5 million (ibid.). Anticipating further
increases in demand however, the consortium announced their decision to begin work on a
second terminal in July 2009. Mr. Bruner said that at least Rs. 4,000 crores (USD 873
million) would be spent on the expansion project, which would include the construction of
the second terminal building on the eastern side of the existing facility, the second runway
and an express terminal on the western side (ibid.). However, these plans are currently on
hold as controversy has arisen over the land utilization pattern of the airport as described
in more detail below. Until it is cleared the consortium is not allowed to continue expansion
work (Kumar 2009). As per the expansion schedule they are expecting 13.4 million
passengers by 2014, 19 million by 2019 and a final capacity of 40 million (India Focus
2009).
4.3.4 Controversies
Despite the overwhelming success of the airport in addressing the escalating
aviation needs of the city, a number of controversies have dogged the project. These
controversies have important implications for the use of land-based finance.
4.3.4.1 Excess Land
In December 2004, the Chief Minister of Karnataka, N. Dharam Singh announced
that of the roughly 4,500 acres acquired for the project, approximately 427 acres would be
kept aside and vested with the KSIIDC as in retrospect it had been found to be in excess of
the requirements for the airport2 3 (The Hindu 2004). This reduced the acreage allocated to
the airport to 4,050 acres. By some accounts this excess land would be used to finance an
23 The criteria for deeming the land 'excess' is not mentioned but it is assumed that it means that as
per KSIIDC calculations, 4,050 acres is sufficient land to build the airport and enough commercial
space to generate an "appropriate" (See Section on Consortium Revenue below) return. As per the
theory of land-based finance this implies equality in marginal costs and revenues.
expressway to the airport as the current access route via National Highways 6 and 7 often
results in long journey times of up to 3 hours (Peterson 2009). The land would be divided
up into 25-acre plots and sold with the proceeds going towards highway construction. By
2007, the market price of the 427-acre parcel was estimated at a minimum of Rs 2,00024
crores (USD 436 million) - more than Rs 4 crores (USD 873,198) per acre - which would
have been more than enough to cover the cost of construction (Peterson 2009, 88; The
Hindu 2007).
However, other proposals for developing this land soon began to surface. In February
2007, the Chairman of the KSIIDC, Yogish Bhat presented a plan to "establish facilities in a
public-private partnership mode" from which they hoped to earn Rs 250 crores (USD 54.5
million) in annual lease rent (The Hindu 2007). In June 2007, State Chief Minister H.D.
Kumaraswamy agreed with the KSIIDC that giving the land on lease rather than auctioning
was preferable, as it would allow the State Government to "mobili[z]e more resources" and
therefore be more beneficial in the long term (Business Standard 2007.). Despite the
Finance Department's opposition to this plan in favor of conducting an auction, they were
instructed to study the new proposal and submit a report so that the Government could
take a final decision. (ibid.)
It is still unclear what will be done with the excess land. There is also not much
clarity from amongst different public sources on how much excess land there is. By some
reports, there is approximately 627-670 acres in excess of which 27 acres has already been
allotted to the Karnataka State Tourism Development Corporation which will use it to build
a hotel, information center and conference facilities (OneIndia, 2007, The Hindu 2007).
More recent reports peg the total amount given to various government agencies, including
Departments of Tourism, Meteorology, Customs, Director-General of Civil Aviation, Mysore
Sales International Limited, Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. and others at
104.57 acres (The Hindu 2008). As of 2008, bidders have been invited to submit plans to
develop 309 acres as the Devanahalli Business Park (DBP). Among the activities planned
for the park are multi-specialty hospitals (to take advantage of the growing medical
24 This valuation figure is consistently cited in a number of sources as a direct quote from the
Chairman of the KSIIDC Yogish Bhat but again the method of valuation or the specific agency
responsible for valuing the property is not mentioned.
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tourism industry), special economic zones, entertainment areas, and 5-star hotels (ibid.).
The business park, which will be built on a BOT basis for an initial lease period of 30 years,
is expected to attract USD 2.2 billion in investment (ibid.). Finally, some sources report that
the public complaints from farmers over the terms of land acquisition have led the State
Government to say that it will return an eighth of an acre of airport land to farmers for each
acre of land that was originally acquired (Peterson 2009). It is unclear whether this last
deal will be implemented as the Law Minister has argued that there is no provision for the
return of excess land under the Land Acquisition Act 25 . Meanwhile plans to build access
routes to the airport - both the planned 'Namma Metro' and the original expressway - still
hang in the balance. Multiple newspaper reports suggest these will be tendered as separate
PPP projects and require further land acquisition.
4.3.4.2 Consortium Revenue & Stakeholder Equity Contribution
As per the proposed revenue structure under the 2006 airport financing guidelines,
the consortium was awarded approximately 2,000 acres more than needed to build the
airport itself so that this land could be developed for commercial purposes (John 2005,
1016). As described below, numerous civil society organizations, independent consultants
and a recent government investigation have alleged that the amount of revenue that the
consortium will earn from this land is excessive relative to regular or 'fair' airport
revenue 26.
Jacob John, a consultant with the Financial Management Service Foundation, an
organization established to promote accountability in development projects, has argued
that the financial structure of the BIA project is unfair to taxpayers and the broader public
who are essentially providing a "massive subsidy" through cheap real estate to ensure the
viability of a project from which they are not benefiting as much as they should. His
argument is based on the following calculations (See John 2006, 1016-1017).
25 Yet, for the nearby Devanahalli IT park, farmers whose land was acquired are being given the
option of Rs 62 lakh in compensation or 9,583 sq ft of developed land for every acre acquired
(Times of India 2008).
26 Unfortunately none of these sources actually quantify what a fair return is or how much they
estimate the excess to be. The report of the government investigation described below is still
private but when released will reveal the extent of overcompensation calculated.
London's Heathrow Airport sits on 35% less land than the Bangalore airport yet its
capacity is almost 1,400 times that of the BIA. John argues that the same is also true for the
Hong Kong and Singapore airports relative to the BIA - both sit on much smaller land
parcels but have a much higher passenger capacity. Moreover, all derive a significant
portion of their revenue from commercial non-aeronautical sources - for example, he says,
for Heathrow this share is nearly forty percent of its total revenue. Given that the BIA will
develop additional capacity over the years, John proposes that we estimate the "excess
land" as the number of acres over Heathrow's total area and arrives at a figure of 1,085
acres in excess. Using the FSI of the nearby International Technology Park in Whitefield,
and a conservative rent of Rs. 2 per square foot, John estimates the consortium earns
monthly revenue of Rs 6 crores (USD 1.3 million) and Rs 2,151 crores (USD 469 million)
over the 30-year period. Using a more "realistic" rate of Rs 4 per square foot, the total
revenue from rentals increases to Rs 4,302 crores (USD 939 million). Both these
calculations assume that no higher intensity development takes place, that rents do not
increase and that rental income is the only source of non-aeronautical revenue. Also, this
ignores the fact that the BIA has been seeking additional land for its expansion plans.
Unfortunately, although he calculates projected returns, John too does not put an
exact number to what he thinks a reasonable return should be or what he estimates to be
the magnitude of overcompensation. Instead, he goes on argues that this revenue translates
into a 'substantial' implicit subsidy on behalf of the State Government to a consortium that
only brought in Rs 50 crores in FDI and yet has received 74% equity in a natural monopoly
enterprise projected to grow at approximately 8 percent a year. Thus he questions whether
the airport is generating enough public benefit to justify the large returns being granted to
a private entity.
The GOK did not undertake the project themselves ostensibly due to a lack of funds
and expertise. Jacob argues that given the volume of the subsidy involved the government
would have been better off "buying" the expertise and earning this revenue directly (John
2006, 1016). To do so, he suggests that they could have divided the project into a real
estate component and airport component with the revenues from the former providing a
cash subsidy to the latter (ibid.). Only if the revenue accrues to the government who can
use it for the "public good" can it be justified to transfer this large increase in land value
away from the original owners. John proposes two ways in which the returns could be
more equitable. One, given that the land acquired appreciated in value by approximately 60
lakhs before construction on the airport even began, the amount of compensation provided
to farmers should be revised upwards. Second, since the terms of the current deal were
worked out on the basis of the land costing Rs 6 lakh (USD 8,732) per acre, he argues that
the equity stake of the KSIIDC be increased so that a greater share of returns flows to the
public (ibid.). If at least these changes are not made, John concludes, the BIA project will be
a "virtual replica" of an older Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor project (described
later in this chapter) that numerous studies have revealed to be more of a "real estate" than
road project (ibid., 1017 and see Raghuram and Sundaram 2009).
Jacob John has not been the only one to object to the earnings of the consortium. In
September 2008, a 21-member Joint Legislative Committee (JLC) comprised of ministers
across political parties in Karnataka was set up by the Speaker of the House when several
Members of the Legislative Assembly who alleged that the BIA was not built to
international standards. The Report, entitled "Examination of Construction of Bengaluru
International Airport (BIA)" was tabled in the Legislative Assembly in December 2009 but
has not yet been released publicly. However, some of the key findings have been widely
reported in the media. In corroboration of John's point above, the report alleges that GOK's
equity stake in the project has been underestimated. Other than the two major heads of
expenditure - the interest-free loan of Rs 35027 crores and the land (with an estimated
present value of Rs 10,000 crores or USD 2.18 billion), the report states that the
government also spent significant amounts on a water pipeline, a power substation and
"contributed" to the project by way of property tax exemptions (Sridhar and Reddy 2009).
In total, the report estimates GOK's contribution to be Rs 843.74 crores (USD 184 million)
(ibid.). Yet the share awarded to the GOK was only thirteen percent versus the 74 percent
awarded to private investors who contributed only Rs 284.60 crores (USD 62 million) or
11.5 percent of the total project cost (Business Line 2009). Given this, the report argues,
27 Referring to the "financial support" provided to BIAL by the Government, the committee
estimated the net present value of the interest-free loan to be only about Rs. 90 crore, "a clear pay-
off of Rs. 245 crores" (Sridhar 2009).
the GOK's equity stake should be revised upwards to reflect their actual contribution (ibid.).
Thus, while John only alleges miscalculation in equity share on the basis of land value
contributed, the report is able to account for other omissions. However, since these
additional omissions could have occurred in any PPP concession agreement, for the
purpose of this thesis the issues relating to the fundamental difficulties in predicting and
estimating the value of the land input are more relevant.
The report goes on to argue that the lack of lock-in stipulations for all of the private
promoters had allowed them to benefit tremendously from their modest investment. On
December 6, L&T, India's largest engineering company, sold its 17% stake in BIA to GVK
Power and Infrastructure Ltd for Rs 686 crores (USD 150 million) (Trading Markets 2009).
In November, Zurich Airport sold 12% of its 17% stake in BIA to GVK. Both the firms
earned 10 times their investment in 2005, valuing the airport at more than $1 billion
within 18 months of its opening (ibid.).
4.3.4.3 User Development Fee
Six months after the airport opened, the BIAL consortium was able to negotiate with
the government to allow them to charge a User Development Fee. Although this fee is not
allowed, except as a last resort, under the 2006 Airport Financing Plan, the consortium
argued that it was necessary as passenger volumes had dropped as a result of the global
recession. BIA currently charges a UDF of Rs 260 on domestic flights and Rs 1,070 on
international flights - less than half of the fee they had originally petitioned for (BIA
website). Other airports in India have made the argument for user development fees as
their estimated earnings from real estate did not meet their expectations.
This fee has been contentious from the start with many arguing that the consortium
should be earning enough revenue from its land bank to offset any temporary losses in
revenue. Partha Mukhopadhyay (2009), a prominent infrastructure specialist and Senior
Fellow at the Center for Policy Research in India writes,
"[P]rivate operators, who were supposed to bear the risk of revenue changes, were
allowed to shift the burden of their commercial mistakes to passengers by charging
"airport development fees". At 20 million users, Rs 250 per passenger generates an
additional Rs 5 billion (USD 109 million) annually. The absence of a regulator helped
facilitate this multi-billon bailout of badly structured modernization projects.
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Despite the concession agreement, the private sector, thus, actually did not bear the
revenue risk."
In May 2009, an Airport Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) was established
whose responsibilities include determining appropriate tariff structures and user fees for
airports. Their first order of business will be to evaluate the hefty UDFs that have been
levied not only by the BIA but also by the Hyderabad and Delhi airports (GOI 2009, 9).
4.3.4.4 Land Utilization
A key issue in the JLC report was the consortium's land utilization pattern; the
report charges BIAL with commercial exploitation of state land. As stated by the report,
"While the state government was generous in giving land, BIA seems to be more interested
in exploiting the land for commercial purposes than using it as passenger service 28." (DNA
India 2009). In light of these findings the state government wants a proper land audit
before any further land utilization and has put a freeze on the expansion plans for the
airport. A member of the panel has asked that excess land be taken back and that the GOK
and AAI as partners should seek renegotiation of the pact with BIAL to ensure that the land
is used more for passenger amenities and other non-commercial purposes. Unfortunately,
as noted by Mukhopadhyay (2009), this seems to be a common trend amongst airports
with "new operators [...] focusing more on growing retail business at airports - worldwide,
airport retail and hotels are a major source of revenue - and quibbling over the definition
of revenue while neglecting the expansion of passenger services".
Beyond land utilization the report also finds that the services and building
standards of the airport are shabby and below international standards thus raising serious
doubts about the padding of costs and actual expenditure incurred in construction (Kumar
2009). However, this problem is a common to all PPPs irrespective of whether or not land
is used as a financing element.
As per the report's recommendations, "the committee is of the view that the actual
allotment of land should have been in a phased manner concurrent with actual utilisation.
It has become imperative for the State to enact a control mechanism to re-establish public
28 At this point the supporting evidence for this allegation is not available.
supremacy while respecting the PPP model that prevails in this liberalised environment,"
the committee report stated (The Hindu 2009).
4.4 Implications for the Use of Land-Based Tools
This section uses the details presented above to illustrate some of the complications
that can arise when land-incentivized tools are applied in practice. Many of these
complications directly contradict the assumptions as described below and therefore have
implications for the neat distributional outcomes predicted by the theory of a land-
incentivized joint venture. As mentioned earlier, it is unrealistic to assume that any tool
would be implemented perfectly in reality. However, since the lack of concrete data on this
case does not allow me to measure the "degree" of failure or success, I use the case merely
as an illustration of potential complications in implementation. These should be kept in
mind when structuring such projects in the future. Chapter 5 will discuss some of the
potential reforms that could help bring 'reality' more in line with the assumptions.
4.4.1 Land is an appropriate tool for finance
As described in Chapter 2, the fundamental premise of land-based finance is that
land is an appropriate financing tool and 'absorbs' the value created by the infrastructure
development. The BIA case seems to indicate that this is true. For one, land values have
risen exponentially in and around the Devanahalli area - from the pre-construction
compensation price of Rs 6 lakh per acre in 1998 to Rs 2 crores (USD 436,600) by 2009
(Deccan Herald 2009). As described before, the airport has also spurred a substantial
increase in the value for surrounding land with increases of between 66 to 166 percent in
official residential land values observed even four months prior to the airport opening
(Deccan Herald 2007). A large part of the increase in value for land surrounding the BIA
occurred when the government rezoned the land from agricultural to non-agricultural. This
further suggests that land does internalize the value of the potential benefits that could
accrue from it as the change would now allow the land to be put to a more remunerative
use than agriculture.
As we saw in Chapter 2, a related assumption of land-based tools is that land is
actually perceived as a valuable asset. Ironically, if the findings of the JLC report are true
and the consortium really is more focused on the commercial exploitation of the land than
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management of the airport then it would suggest that this assumption holds true and
private investors would in most cases appreciate the potential of land as an asset that
would continue to earn them high returns in the future. Indeed, as documented by Montek
Singh Ahluwalia (2009), the Head of the Planning Commission it has been a challenge to
attract private investment in big infrastructure projects (1):
Several experienced international companies are interested in investing in
infrastructure development in Asia provided the overall investment climate is
perceived as attractive, and many countries in the region have domestic
entrepreneurs keen to enter these sectors. [...] The slow pace has not reflected the lack
of private capital. Although the resources available are probably inadequate to meet all
of the infrastructure needs of the region, which are indeed enormous, fewer private
sector projects are currently being financed than are feasible with current levels of
resource availability. In other words, the operative constraint is not the level of
resource availability but the ability to structure projects in a manner suitable for
private financing.
Ahluwalia attributes much of this reluctance to the predominant use of a tariff-
based system for public infrastructure projects that inspires little faith in private investors
that they will be adequately compensated for their investment. In this case it appears that
land might well be a viable alternative to attracting private investors. Of course the fact that
airports are a natural monopoly with consequently less revenue risk might be part of the
appeal. Particularly in instances where acquisition of land is cheap and pre-construction
land prices are low, the scope for returns is greater and land's use as a financing tool in
PPPs is more effective. Yet none of this implies that the capture of increments is equitable.
4.4.2 Increments can be estimated, captured and distributed in an accurate
and non-controversial way
Unfortunately the Bangalore case seems to indicate that this assumption simplifies
some of the complexity of estimating and determining the distribution of returns. In reality,
governments as the main actors have to manage the expectations of private investors as
well as their responsibility to their citizens. In addition, they might also have their own
agenda either as individuals within the organization or as an agency as a whole. If this is
the case then actual distributions might not correspond to theoretical divisions of land
value increments.
For instance, judging by the fact that more than 400 acres of land were found to be
in excess, it seems that the KSIIDC was not able to correctly estimate the future value of the
land they were granting to the consortium, at least at the time of acquisition. Nor, either
for a lack of data or maybe even intentionally, did they seem to be able to estimate the true
value of the land they were taking away from the original landowners. Most media reports
concur that compensation has been woefully inadequate with a majority of the displaced
being pushed even deeper into poverty (Shivanand and Srivatsa 2008, 2009 and Times of
India 2008). While some of these estimation problems might have stemmed from a lack of
information problem as will be described below some might have accrued from the selfish
desire to reduce their own costs of acquisition. The KSIIDC was in a bad financial condition
at the time that they executed the airport deal. Their aspirations to become a larger player
in the infrastructure finance realm however hinged on winning the consortium as much of
a share in land value increments as they possibly could. Thus it is conceivable that they
could have utilized their power as the government to short-change those who had little
power to resist at the time. In the last few years land acquisitions in Devanahalli have taken
place at astronomical prices; compensation for land acquired for the Devanahalli Industrial
Park has touched 70 lakhs (USD 152, 810) per acre (Deccan Herald 2010). While this might
reflect actual land prices in the area, post-airport construction, it may also be
overcompensation to savvy farmers who now understand their leverage in this high
demand situation. At both ends of the spectrum this level of compensation might be
entirely different from that deemed 'fair' in theory with resultant implications for the
overall net zero welfare effect. If indeed, John's estimation described above holds true, then
due to incorrect estimation (of compensation and land value contribution) the distribution
of benefits in this case has benefited some parties more than others. Moreover, 'social
benefit' itself is hard to measure so it is hard to quantify how much the city has benefited
from the airport even if the landowners have been the net losers.
Given the precarious condition of the KSIIDC and high levels of debt-indebtedness at
the State level across India it is important that State governments are able to estimate, with
some degree of certainty, the benefits they are affording to private investors, their
opportunity cost and the returns they can hope to make of their investment. The purpose of
undertaking the airport project on a PPP was to alleviate and limit the burden of
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investment on the State to 350 crores plus the cost of land. It appears from both the
findings of the JLC report and Jacob John's calculation that instead the GOK ended up
shouldering a heavier investment than anticipated partly due to difficulties in estimating
the future value and development potential of the land.
There are a number of reasons - simple miscalculation, political pressure or
perverse incentives within organizations - that can affect estimation and distribution and
these will be discussed in the sections below. These demonstrate that while a certain
distribution of returns might be economically rational and equitable, they might be hard to
execute in actual practice.
4.4.3 Information is Perfect and Bargaining Power Symmetric
The tools of land-based finance implicitly assume that the information needed to
accurately estimate returns, predict future increases in value, calculate the amount of land
needed and so on is available and perfect so that authorities will have all the information
they need to arrive at pareto optimal solutions where there are no winners or losers. For
instance as we saw in Chapter 2 developer exactions assume we can precisely estimate the
increased burden of growth. If they did not assume this then their use would be hard to
defend.
Perfect information is a common assumption in many economic theories, but one
that has shown time and time again not to hold up in reality. There are a number of reasons
why information is not perfect in the real world. One set of reasons relates to the simple
lack of availability of data. For example, when compensating landowners in Devanahalli the
lack of transaction records and formal tenure could have allowed the government to
acquire the land at a price they deemed appropriate with little basis for contestation.
According to a number of newspaper reports hundreds of unauthorized cultivators who
did not possess ownership documents yet had cultivated government land for decades
were excluded from compensation decisions 29 (Gandhi 2009). While the latter especially
might be entirely fair and in fact protect the government from squatters and false claims
the broader point is that in countries where formal systems to track value, ownership and
29 As quoted earlier, apparently many of these cultivators were on the verge of having their
"ownership" formally recognized until the decision to acquire the land came up (Gandhi 2009).
transactions are not widespread, information failures are common. For example, when
outlining some of the reasons for the initial hesitation to allow residential and commercial
development on agricultural land in the larger Devanahalli area, a senior official in the
GOK's revenue department explained, "There are no proper revenue records maintained at
the taluk office on several survey numbers. Sixty per cent of the lands are grants to
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This can only complicate conversion sanctions."
(Madhusoodan 2009)
Another set of reasons for imperfect information relates to the simple
unpredictability of future developments that might generate greater or lesser returns than
predicted. For example, the airport construction seems to have created a real estate boom
in Devanahalli and the subsequent building of IT parks and residential estates in the area
has pushed up land prices even further (Times of India 2008). Some farmers who owned
land along the existing access road to the airport have sold their land at 1 crore (USD
218,300) per acre or entered profitable rent-sharing agreements with developers who
build on their property (ibid.). As John (2009) argues the equity share was negotiated on
the basis of land costing Rs 6 lakh per acre; maybe if the KSIIDC had been able to correctly
estimate how much revenue the land could generate in the future they could have claimed
a greater share of the profits. Similarly, it appears that an inability to price future revenue
streams from the land led to them to miscalculate how much land would be required to
sufficiently compensate the consortium with a reasonable rate of return. While the former
issue of the equity stake can be more easily rectified (e.g by introducing a clause for a
sliding scale for returns above a certain amount in concession agreements30) the latter
issue is largely irreversible and can have negative equity implications if more landowners
are displaced than is necessary. Thus, especially with land markets, which are cyclical,
unpredictable and influenced by more than one factor, information asymmetries are quite
likely. To go back to Phatak's point in Chapter 2 - developer exactions tend to uphold the
30 Dr. Ashwini Bhide and Dr. Satish Bagal (2009) of the MMRDA assert that since it is very difficult
to know the actual value released by land, infrastructure development with commercial use of land
should have absolute clarity in the Concession Agreement and continual monitoring by
independent engineers and accountants (23).
'rational nexus' between the cost and benefit of infrastructure much better in
environments where greater predictability can be assured.
Other reasons that make the assumption of perfect information problematic relate
to natural monopolies in information. While I have not encountered any evidence of this in
this case, it is possible that a private consortium can have more sophisticated methods or
"insider" information to better predict their level of revenue than the government which it
is not in their interest to share or vice versa. Similarly, a lack of sophistication amongst
farmers might have put them at a natural disadvantage to the government back in 1998 if
they were not able to estimate just how much value they were losing. Thus whatever the
reason for the information failure, this case illustrates a number of instances where it
might exist.
In theory, land-incentivized joint ventures imply that bargaining power between
parties is equal. However, there are a number of reasons why this assumption might not
hold true. The JLC report reports serious lapses in drafting the Concession Agreement that
were heavily loaded to benefit the private participants (The Hindu 2009). At present a clear
listing of these lapses is not available but this does suggest that in any negotiation
distributional outcomes might differ based on the relative balance of power between
parties at the table or parties' real interests in the negotiation. Given the strong demand for
an airport in Bangalore and a reported inability of the KSIIDC to finance it at the time, it is
possibly that the GOK had less leverage at the time to demand a greater share of revenues.
Similarly they could have made the conscious decision to compensate the consortium
above the amount 'public benefit' they were creating, in contradiction to the theory of land-
incentivized joint ventures. While there is no more than speculative evidence of
concessions at this time, it seems fair to suggest that asymmetries in bargaining power can
potentially skew the distribution of created value in favor of a particular party. Thus, it is
important not to ignore this factor when structuring a land-incentivized joint venture and
take steps to minimize it as far as possible so that distribution is actually made on the basis
of contributions to land value increments.
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4.4.4 Government Rationality, Capacity and Master Planning
Land-based finance tools assume that governments are rational and act in the public
interest. Unfortunately, the BIA case seems to indicate that government action is not always
the best course. Anecdotal evidence from a range of newspapers indicates that the KSIIDC
did not take much care to ensure that compensation or rehabilitation for the project-
affected people was well thought out or carefully executed. For instance, many of those
relocated were moved to sites 12 kilometers away where water scarcities made farming
difficult and employment less accessible (Shivananda and Srivatsa 2009). As mentioned
before, there is also a general agreement that the compensation amount awarded to the
displaced landowners was inadequate (Times of India 2008). At the other end of the
spectrum, compensation in later acquisitions for the Business Park have proved extremely
lucrative with small farmers making huge windfall gains overnight (ibid.). Yet neither
outcome necessarily demonstrates government rationality as much as a growing
awareness amongst farmers and other small landowners of the potential value of their
assets. In a separate Joint Legislative Committee probe into how Karnataka politicians were
facilitating the "great land grab" happening in Bangalore, it was found that the certain
government agencies and "powerful lobbies" were complicit in destroying revenue records
when the BIA project was announced (Srinivasaraju 2007). Regrettably, this is not an
isolated incident in India where such revelations are all too common (see Sridhar and
Reddy 2009, 54). Thus assuming government rationality might be problematic and steps to
ensure greater transparency and institutionalized checks and balances should be
considered in implementing future such projects.
A related assumption for effective implementation of a land-incentivized joint
venture is that governments have the required capacity to correctly calculate returns, land
requirements, value increases and the like. As described in Section 4.4.2 the KSIIDC seemed
to have incorrectly estimated how much land was needed for the project and how much
value they were effectively contributing to it. However, this is not entirely surprising for a
government entity entering such a partnership for the first time. As Ashwini Bhide and Dr.
Satish Bagal (2009) of the MMRDA have observed, part of the difficulties in management of
such projects stem from the fact that handling real estate issues requires different and
complex capacities that existing government bodies might not have or because the nature
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of government functioning may not permit a quick response to the markets (23). Uma
Asudumilli (2009) of the MMRDA critiques such real estate-driven projects by saying that
they assume that appropriate accounting of the components is possible when in reality the
absence of asset valuation as established practice in India and inadequate project
preparation often leads to incorrect valuation of the real estate value of land (17). Thus, at
present it seems that a large number of government bodies in India will lack the capacity to
handle such computation and project valuation tasks especially as the scale of the project
and land component increases (ibid).
Lastly, many land-based tools assume that government decisions are made on the
basis of a long-term master plan for the city. As Phatak describes in Chapter 2, the
mandatory preparation of capital improvement plans in the US is one of the major reasons
why developer exactions can be worked out with confidence. However, it does not appear
that this project was executed amidst a stable long-term plan for the area. Controversy has
shrouded the choice of Devanahalli as a site with allegations that the decision was leaked
ahead of time to allow politicians and their confidantes enough lead-time to make money of
real estate speculation in the area. Numerous newspapers articles have reported that "real
estate sharks" have spent lakhs of rupees buying up property in the area surrounding the
BIA to cash in on the real estate boom (DNA India 2009). In January 2009 it was reported
that the Chief Minister BS Yeddyurappa was reconsidering the sanction that had rezoned
the use of the predominantly agricultural land in the Devanahalli area to non-agricultural
purposes (ibid.). This was being done due to concerns over the capacity of infrastructure in
the area to support large growth and reports from geophysicists that the groundwater in
the area was already severely depleted (ibid.). However, if this sanction was revoked then
those who had bought land adjacent to the airport would not be able to develop it as
planned and would lose their investment. While it is not the responsibility of the
government to protect the interests of speculators in real estate markets, the back and
forth in zoning decisions or the lack of transparent and reliable plans for the area are
indicators of the fact that as discussed before, institutions in India, particularly in India are
still in the process of evolving. In 2009, the Bangalore International Airport Area Planning
Authority (BIAAPA) was instituted to manage development in the larger Devanahalli area.
As jurisdictional overlaps are resolved and new roles and responsibilities assigned it might
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be difficult, at least in the initial years, to have stable and uncontested long-term master
plans. Information asymmetries described in Section 4.4.3 could potentially be more
common during an adjustment period. Eventually, the sanction was not revoked and the
Devanhalli Business Park and other development project appear to be in process (Shenoy
2010).
4.4.5 Political Insulation
A related assumption to government rationality is that estimates and decisions
regarding distribution between stakeholders can be made free from political compulsions.
In reality, the compulsions of competitive populism might lead to a preference for
politically motivated rather than economically rational decisions.
Recent investigations of the Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor (BMIC) a now
notorious but once pioneering land-incentivized joint venture undertaken over 20 years
(but never completed) have shown that the project was rife with stories of politicization
and corruption:
According to various newspaper reports as well as Supreme Court
observations, approvals and facilitating activities slowed down whenever a
particular political party was a part of the government. Even the government's
stand in various courts kept changing, depending on the party that was
heading it. The government went to the extent of reviewing the
project and scrapping the same... (Raghuram and Sundaram 2010, 246-7)
Numerous government officials who had advised on the BMIC project went on to
work for the executing Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises (NICE) consortium in
later years. Moreover, issues of excess land, lack of clarity on actual amount of acquisition
and under- compensation to farmers that bear resemblance to the BIA issues plagued this
project as well and were shown to be largely due to rent-seeking activities (ibid., 246).
Unfortunately, such stories are quite common in India. For the BIA case however,
while there are numerous allegations of corruption, I do not have any reliable proof or
studies to back them up. However, small instances demonstrate where political pressure
may sway decisions away from economic rationality. For example, the fact that the state
government strongly considered returning developed land as compensation despite the
fact that it is not allowed under the terms of the Land Acquisition Act, might be a potential
indicator of the power of politics in the state. Similarly, the decision to override the Finance
Department's opposition to the sale of excess land points as described above might allude
to outcomes being negotiated on the basis of political power and not economic merit.
In an interesting turn of events, the Congress Party's leader on the JLC panel DK
Shivakumar - who had demanded and initiated the JLC probe in the first place - rejected
the findings of the report and petitioned to have its proposals revoked. Shivakumar and at
least one other member of the Committee alleged that the Head of the Committee Dr.
Hemachandra Sagar had tabled the report in a hasty manner without giving them enough
time to read it through. In a public statement Shivakumar rejecting the findings of the
report and in particular its indictment of a number of important bureaucrats and
businessmen (Deccan Herald 2009). Indeed, the report has proved quite contentious with
the committee divided on the recommendations presented in the report (ibid.). Again,
while this anecdotal evidence is far from concrete proof and the differences in opinion
might also be healthy, given the manner in which opposition politics play out in much of
the country it might not be a stretch to imagine that in some cases this sudden change of
sentiment could indicate political pressure to rescind punitive action.
Thus the point of these examples is to illuminate that it is not always the case that the
best economic outcome is prioritized and the "transaction costs" in economies lacking
political insulation might be one reason for deviations from pareto optimal outcomes.
4.4.6 Institutional Separation and Checks and Balances
Broadly speaking, land-based financing tools are most successful when institutional
arrangements are set up so that there are enough checks and balances in the system to
prevent a principal-agent problem from developing. We saw in the Chapter 2 how
principal-agent problems might lead to misuse of land asset management. Unfortunately, in
the BIA case it appears that possibly due to an evolving institutional structure, where for
the most part the KSIIDC as the implementation arm of the State Government had free
reign, there were not many institutionalized checks and balances in place. As increased
decentralization takes hold and as urbanization creates new cities or city-regions a
thorough restructuring of institutions that have managed growth and development so far
looks important. In the meantime, the legacy of institutions structured for a different
demographic and economic context might continue to complicate the implementation and
regulation of land-incentivized joint ventures.
4.4.7 Underlying System of Land: Land Laws, Acquisition Policy, Ownership
Patterns and Land Records
One of the more troublesome assumptions of land-based finance tools is that they
often do not fully appreciate the context of the land markets in which they are being
deployed. The lack of information that comes from poor record keeping and a legacy
informal ownership is such one factor already discussed above. Another assumption
discussed in Chapter 2 relates to the structure of ownership of land with its attendant
implications for intergenerational equity and for economic and social development.
Two additional and pressing omissions are the failure to account for the history and
practice of land acquisition in a country and for existing structural inefficiencies in land
markets.
The price at which land can be acquired in a country can have profound implications
for how much is acquired and built and therefore how much excess benefit is created and
where it is captured. In the BIA case, the artificially low cost of land and the 'ease' of
procurement gave the KSIIDC the incentive or ability to acquire more than what was
needed and thus facilitated the transfer of value from public to private hands. Meanwhile
landowners were not awarded benefits (in the form of compensation) that were
commensurate with their "costs". Since the consortium's land allocation was priced at a
mere Rs 4 lakhs per acre they may have been granted much more land than they would
have been if the acquisition process had been undertaken at the correct market value. As a
result of the mispricing it appears that the bulk of the costs (or lost benefits) were borne by
the landowners who transferred them to the consortium and general public. As per John's
(2009) argument and that of the JLC Report on the incorrectly estimated equity stake, the
KSIIDC too transferred away more of its benefits than it should have. Although it is
unrealistic to assume that in practice every party would receive benefits equal to their
costs this case does suggest that land acquisitions that take place at artificially high or low
prices can have implications for the distribution of benefits.
Structural inefficiencies in land markets can cause similar distortions. The discussion
around FSI in Chapter 2 describes how years of regulation in planning in India has
created high scarcity rents (See Section 2.2.2 for more details). Similarly, restrictions
such as Non-Agricultural Clearances can potentially be manipulated for unfair capture
of value by rent-seeking government entities who enjoy arbitrary power over such
regulation. As discussed in Section 4.4.1 a large part of the increase in value for land
surrounding the BIA occurred when the government rezoned the land from agricultural
to non-agricultural and landowners were not granted any share of this increase. While
this itself is not a problem it indicates that certain structural inefficiencies in land
markets - such as historically undervalued prices for agricultural land - have
implications for both the price of acquisition and the extent to which zoning can be
misused for private gain. Perhaps, if as Morris and Pandey (2010) argue, were urban
land use regulations more market friendly to start with they would have resulted in
minimum absolute scarcity rents on land and reduced the scope for rents to politicians,
builders, land sharks and the mafia and lowered the cost of providing infrastructure (7).
Thus they argue:
[S]ince the business of real estate and land valuation is still in its infancy in
India, governments role (especially of the central government) in aiding the
creation of intellectual capital to this important aspect of business and life is
important, since otherwise the reform itself is likely to be hijacked by vested
interests who have gained enormously through the administrative and ad-hoc
process of determining land use, acquiring land and granting/allocating land.
(Morris and Pandey 2010, 20).
4.4.8 Cost of Externalities and Second Round Effects
As described earlier any infrastructure investment generates both positive and
negative externalities. If the theory translated perfectly into practice then in the BIA case
we would have seen adequate compensation of those who were negatively impacted so
that the net welfare effect is zero. However, the information presented above seems to
indicate that this is not the case. Moreover, it might also be the case that there are further
externalities that the land-incentivized joint venture did not account for. These
externalities may be more prevalent in certain contexts than others. For example, while a
large number of farmers displaced by subsequent development around the airport area
received large windfall gains that allowed most of them to relocate comfortably, not all of
them have known how to manage their newfound wealth. To quote the Karnataka Rajya
Raitha Sangha President K S Puttannaiah, "Many don't succeed as they lack elementary
knowledge about running a business. Sometimes they get so much money that they don't
know what to do with it. They spend it all on a lavish lifestyle and end up as paupers"
(Times of India 2008). The social and economic burden of this fallout might pose an
additional cost to the state or city government that land-based finance does not
compensate for. The idea that land-based finance should account for the costs of these
externalities might be more defensible when compensation is not adequate. In these cases,
those who know no other way to support themselves than agriculture and lack the
education to find other jobs may migrate to slums, which in turn puts additional pressure
on urban systems and grants a less secure future for their children. In fact this has been
observed amongst some of those displaced by the original airport land acquisition (Srivatsa
and Shivanand 2008). Many locals who can no longer afford the cost of living in Devanhalli
where real estate development has pushed up the prices of housing and essentials have
also moved out even if their land is not acquired (Srivatsa and Shivanand 2008). While it is
not necessary to do so in every case (for instance if those relocating receive a good price for
the homes they vacate) there are instances where the developmental context - levels of
literacy, the lack of affordable housing elsewhere in the city, or employment for welfare
programs - create additional costs that are not factored into the cost of the project. As far
as possible it is important to at least keep these impacts in mind when designing the
distribution of costs and-benefits; current "formulas" of land based-finance might operate
in silos in a way that is not suited for developmental contexts like India.
4.4.9 Partial Capitalization and Time Lags
As the homeowner example in Section 2.3.9 described time lags in ownership may
have led to under or overcompensated landowners in Devanahalli. However, at present the
lack of data makes this point hard to establish.
4.4.10 Continually Increasing Land Values
At present the consortium is earning large gains on their real estate as a result of the
boom in land values around the airport. This revenue stream however seems like it will be
contingent on the continued increase in land prices in the area. If land prices drop, or
increased availability of space lowers rents in the area (See Section 2.3.10), then the
returns promised by the land-incentivized joint venture might not materialize.
4.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has used the story of the BIA case to construct a picture of how easily
many of the assumptions of land-incentivized joint ventures and other tools can be
contradicted. In particular it seems the allocation of costs and benefits is not as
straightforward and equitable as predicted. Again, while some of these problems stem from
the difficulties inherent in managing PPPs independent of land contributions, many also
come from the fact that the value of land as an asset is hard to allocate and manage. Chapter
5 concludes by suggesting possible reforms that could be undertaken so that the
fundamental assumptions of land-based finance can appear more realistic in the future.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
The previous chapter used the BIA case to help illustrate how a number of the
implicit assumptions of land-incentivized joint ventures as developed in Chapter 2 might
not hold up in actual implementation. When reality does not correspond to the enabling
preconditions suggested by the theory, actual outcomes might deviate from what is
predicted. While the lack of quantifiable data for the BIA case does not allow me to measure
the degree of deviation, from the information available it appears that a number of
distortions and structural inefficiencies exist that could complicate the implementation of
land-incentivized joint ventures in Bangalore. Some of these inefficiencies may relate to
antiquated legal systems while others represent an institutional context in flux and as yet
not fully equipped or designed to represent a changed demographic context and the
requirements of new modes of financing. Tentative information presented in chapter 4
seems to indicate that not only might these distortions have led to less optimal outcomes
than predicted in theory but that use of land-incentivized joint ventures without first
correcting these underlying inefficiencies could actually compound their effects. Many
scholars and policy analysts in India have raised similar concerns about land-based public
finance that I will discuss in more detail below.
At the same time it is hard to ignore the seemingly large potential of land to
incentivize private investment on this scale. Eventually, the BIA consortium was successful
in delivering an airport to the city of Bangalore and seems to have encouraged large-scale
development and investment in the larger Devanahalli area. According to the Chairman of
the KSIIDC, the once defunct agency is now looking to become "a major infrastructure arm
of the Karnataka Government" and has a number of projects on its plate from the Dhabol-
Bangalore Gas Pipeline to the high speed rail link to the airport and Tadri Sea Port all being
undertaken on a PPP basis (The Hindu 2009 and Shenoy 2010). If properly used then, it is
possible that land-incentivized joint ventures could also play a catalytic role in reversing
the fortunes of State Government bodies that have languished for too long under the lack of
Central Government funds 31. For these reasons (and others as discussed in Chapter 3) it is
31 Although the JLC Report argues that the KSIIDC has ended up footing a larger part of the
investment bill than originally planned and John (2009) suggests that KSIIDC has provided too
important not to be dissuaded by the use of land as a financing option but rather look to
avenues through which the regulatory, institutional and market context can be
strengthened and distortions ironed out.
This chapter suggests some possible reforms that might be considered to bring
about greater convergence between the assumed preconditions and ground reality and
briefly speculates how their prior implementation might have impacted outcomes in the
BIA case.
5.1 Land Reform
One of the most important areas for reform seems to be land - its acquisition and
management by public authorities.
Amendments to the Land Acquisition Act are currently being debated in the
Parliament (See Shah 2010). Thus the huge costs the current method of acquisition
imposes on both those displaced and to private capital investment are already been
recognized by numerous lawyers, policy makers, academics and politicians. Amongst the
proposals for reform it has been suggested that the requiring body establish why the
specific parcel of land they want to acquire is needed and why it cannot be substituted with
land elsewhere. This reform seeks to address the problem of imperfect information and
political collusion that can allow rent-seeking government bodies to arbitrarily acquire
land based on their own or other vested interests, and not necessarily in accordance with
economic or spatial rationality. In the BIA case this reform would have required the KSIIDC
to justify why the airport had to be built in Devanahalli and why it could not be
accommodated elsewhere, perhaps where the GOK already held a large share of the land.
Not only would this change help justify the resultant cost of acquisition and possible reduce
displacement but it would also allay fears amongst landowners that the project was not an
arbitrary decision or a disguised land grab. It would also ensure that infrastructure is built
at an optimum location for its functioning.
much of an implicit subsidy to the consortium it would be interesting for further research to
examine how the BIA case may have catalyzed the fortunes of the KSIIDC. It is possible that they
may have made losses, or less profits than hoped on their first project but that it has given them
either the stature, recognition, expertise or earnings to become a larger infrastructure player in the
future.
A related reform that has been proposed by a number of lawyers, bureaucrats and
others is that of requiring private investors to acquire approximately seventy to seventy-
five percent of the land by themselves before approaching the government for acquisition
assistance when the land is to be put to commercial use (See Shah 2010 and Morris and
Pandey 2010, 13). As the private sector has stepped into the provision of services that were
previously defined as the "public domain" and governments have begun to undertake
commercially oriented activities, the notion of 'public purpose' needs to be more clearly
defined. As Morris and Pandey write in a 2007 paper on further proposed reforms to the
Land Acquisition Act:
"Since amendment to the LAA in compulsory acquisitions in 1984 the discretionary
power of the government has gone up in several ways: The period from
announcement of intent to acquire to possession has been shortened. And most
importantly government can acquire land for companies - i.e. even if the land is to
be owned and used by private companies or any party for that matter. But since the
public purpose is not defined in any case, this has opened the door wide for
government to acquire land for many reasons. Thus lands have been acquired for
housing colonies, ashrams, manufacturing enterprises, entertainment
establishments, service industries etc. Indeed the working framework is one where
all large investors bank upon government to acquire land for them. The considerable
transfers that this results in, both on account of excess land being asked for and
acquired, and because of the vast depression in prices due to prior regulatory
restraints are very large. Today such inequity portends to create large-scale protests
and dissatisfaction and make an otherwise democratic state system oppressive" (15).
[emphasis mine]
Indeed reforms such as the two described briefly above that somewhat curtail the
freedom of the government as to acquire land are becoming increasingly crucial. As a major
land rush has gripped the country almost every industrial house has petitioned the
government to use the Land Acquisition Act on their behalf to help them acquire land. An
article in Business World (2010) reports:
Indian companies, funds (both Indian and overseas), and entrepreneurs are buying
land as if there is no tomorrow. According to estimates, they are in the process of
acquiring some 400,000 acres of land. That's four times the size of Mumbai, double
the size of Hong Kong, and slightly more than the size of the National Capital Region
(NCR) (Business World 2010).
Driving this land rush has been the realization that unlike China or Singapore where the
infrastructure build-up was undertaken by the State, in India it will be driven by the private
sector (Business World 2010). For the BIA case however, given the public good nature of
airports, it is unlikely that the private consortium would have been asked to acquire the
bulk of the land themselves. Thus this latter reform is discussed in less detail here.
A third set of reforms that could bring greater perceived fairness to the acquisition
process is in the area of compensation and resettlement policy. Already in 2003 the
National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project-Affected Families was
formulated to provide additional compensation to project-affected families, over and above
the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. This legislation acknowledges the particular
structure of land ownership in the country where both title and non-title holders may
derive their livelihood from a piece of land (Raghuram, Bastian and Sundaram 2010, 6).
Moreover, since State laws have varied in their level of compensation and their definition of
what constitutes "project affected people" this policy seeks to bring greater equality to
displaced people across the country (ibid.). Unfortunately however this policy has been
widely regarded as a failure especially in its inability to address the most fundamental
issue of contention - that of forcible acquisition of land without taking into account any
input from displaced people themselves (ACHR 2007). Draft Policies to rectify the above-
mentioned, and other omissions have been drafted again in 2006 and 2007. These too have
met with criticism and to date a number of issues remain to be addressed. Criticisms
include the high threshold for qualification of displacement so that only very large scale
displacements of people might fall under this policy, exclusion of landowners and project
affected people from the decision-making process and the complete inability under the
legal system to oppose acquisition once it has been approved by the relevant government
authority (ACHR 2007).
Given that much of the land for the BIA was acquired before the 2003 policy was
instated this reform did not apply to the project. However, if it had, it might have allowed
the landowners to obtain greater compensation for the land acquired and also potentially
provided support to some of those not recognized by the KSIIDC as being project-affected.
This may have reduced some of the negative externalities generated by the project as
discussed in 4.4.8. However it is not clear that assigning the responsibility for designating
people as project-affected or not is better conducted at a national rather than a more local
level as the scope for fraudulent claims might be more. In a Position Paper on the Airports
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Sector in India, the national Department of Economic Affairs has recognized the need for
airports to develop their own policies on resettlement, compensation and rehabilitation of
project affected people. Recognizing that it is hard to sidestep the need to acquire land
when such large land parcels are required they suggest:
"There should be proper and comprehensive guidelines in respect of how much land is
required for a particular airport and the way to pay the compensation. The project
affected people should be made as partners in the project. The guidelines also should
include how to handle the issues in case land acquisition involves religious structures"
(22)
Thus, while acquisition seems to be causing a number of difficulties at present, it
appears that steps are being taken at numerous levels to address this problem so that
future land-incentivized joint ventures might yield more equitable distributional outcomes.
It might be added however, that the reform of including project-affected people as partners
in the project does not necessarily overcome the issue of asymmetry in bargaining power
discussed above especially if landowners are able to ally with powerful politicians or
lobbies.
Other proposed amendments to the Land Acquisition Act seek to bring greater
rationality to the acquisition process by requiring more independence and impartiality in
the required social and economic impact surveys, land valuations and in the appointment
of the Administrator of Rehabilitation and Resettlement (ACHR 2007). Provisions have also
been suggested that allow the "acquirees" to appeal the method of valuation and request a
second professional valuer to vet the recommendations of the first (Moriss and Pandey
2010, 15). Indeed, assistance in the valuation of land in the BIA case could have potentially
led to greater accuracy in the amount of land acquired and an equity stake for the KSIIDC
commensurate with their contribution to the project. Independent valuation could also
have guarded against any deliberate attempts to under or over compensate any of the
parties involved. Thus this reform is a step towards addressing both any government
capacity and political insulation problems that the project may have encountered.
Beyond land acquisition reform, on which numerous experts have written, other
areas for reform are the strengthening of land records, formalization of title and recording
of transactions. As we saw in Chapter 4, a lack of information in this sphere might have
been responsible for the inadequate compensation of both those affected by the project and
the KSIIDC as it became harder to predict future revenue streams that might accrue from
land. Simultaneous reform to build capacity for valuation and estimation within
government bodies as discussed by Bhide (2009), Bagal (2009) and Adusumilli (2009)
while also improving collection of land and transaction data might go a long way towards
improving the outcomes of land-based finance. If new notions of private property and
ownership are to inform national policy then it is important that these notions be reflected
in reality on the ground as well. Although this is not a change that can typically happen
overnight, it is one that seems important to initiate.
5.2 Institutional Reform and Capacity Building
The comments of Bhide (2009), Bagal (2009) and Adusumilli (2009) of the MMRDA
cited in Section 4.4.4 point to the need to strengthen capacity in government offices so that
they are able to correctly handle land-based deals and the complex valuation and
estimation that they involve. Even if independent valuation does, as I hope, become part of
established practice for most land-based tools, it is important that these skills are
developed in house as well so that both sides might vet each other's recommendations.
As the KSIIDC expands its participation in infrastructure projects in the state it will be
important both for their own finances (and therefore presumably the public good) and for
the investment climate in the state for them to better understand and manage returns in
the land markets.
This previous reform actually goes hand in hand with the issue of institutional
reform whereby at the national, state and local government level a reformulation of power
and jurisdiction could be undertaken to better address the demands of new urban realities.
We saw earlier that the KSIIDC saw it fit to create the BIAAPA to manage development in
the Devanhalli area. Since ninety percent of Devanahalli was rural prior to the airport
development this institution must have been necessary to replace older rural governance
structures. As new local institutions are created and jurisdictions negotiated, credible
checks to power might prove vital to curtailing the power of rent-seeking institutions and
promoting transparency and public availability of information. As we saw in Chapter 2,
almost all the tools of land-based finance can be manipulated for personal gain when
principal-agent problems are possible.
At the national level, as the government moves more towards PPPs and greater
private provision of infrastructure, institutional reform might take the form of new
regulatory bodies to manage the returns and serve as a point of redressal for all parties
involved. As described in Section 4.3.4.3 the AERA was set up to manage private
investments in the airport sector. Regulation, if properly undertaken, may even create a
better investment climate for private and even international capital to enter the country.
On the flip side however, if the regulatory bodies are perceived as being intrusive or
excessively conservative, then there could be negative implications for attracting
investment. Already regulatory bodies to manage investments in ports, telecom, private
utilities and beyond have been considered and in February of 2009 the Competition
Commission of India was set up, although it will not function for another few years
(Mukhopadhyay 2009).
Lastly, as institutions evolve, particularly at the municipal or local level it is hoped
that the regulation they impose will also move towards being more market oriented so that
minimum scarcity rents of the sort described by Phatak (2009) and Morris and Pandey
(2010) decrease. It is important that the returns being earned from land-based finance are
perceived as fair and actually belonging to the party who claims them (See discussion of FSI
in Section 2.2.2). While this might have the impact of reducing the amount of money that
local governments can earn it will go a long way towards protecting the overall integrity of
the use of this financing mechanism. Without addressing these issues Morris and Pandey
(2010) argue the infrastructure thus financed could be unnecessarily expensive, exclude or
disadvantage a large section of the population and act as an impediment to broader social
and economic development (3).
The use of land-incentivized joint ventures faces an uncertain future in India. If
properly utilized their legacy could be the timely and efficient creation of the infrastructure
needed to support a rapidly growing nation. As per the theory, land could generate just the
amount of finance required to cover the project cost without unfairly disadvantaging any of
the parties involved. Yet if they fail due to inadequate supporting reform or bad project
management, they could result in large-scale misappropriation, a deepening of existing
inequalities and an unfriendly environment for private capital. Reform appears vital before
these tools are employed at a larger scale. As Ramesh Ramanathan sums it up "There is no
justification in opening the funding taps if the buckets of our [nation's] budgets have holes
in them" (Ramanathan 2010).
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